On February 26, 2002, a week after The New York Times divulged the existence of the Office of Strategic Influence (the Pentagon group which built support for the war on terror through psychological operations targeted at foreign media), Secretary of Defense Donald “Rumsfeld said it was being ‘closed down,’ not so much as a matter […]
2/26/2002
“According to the U.S. Defense Department [in a ‘fact sheet’ on February 26, 2002], [in Afghanistan, following the collapse of the Taliban] the number rose to about eleven thousand foreign troops, among them five thousand American soldiers, by February 2002. This number was wholly inadequate in a country where a Soviet occupation force of 120,000 […]
2/25/2002
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “519. From late February 2002, the UK Government position was that Iraq was a threat that had to be dealt with; that Iraq needed to disarm in accordance with the obligations imposed by the UN; and that it was important to agree to the […]
2/23/2002
“In a newspaper interview [with The San Francisco Chronicle on February 23, 2002], [Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul] Wolfowitz said the United States ‘could not wait for proof beyond a reasonable doubt [regarding the link between Iraq and al Qaeda]‘ because, when there was a possibility of weapons of mass destruction being used, to wait […]
2/23/2002
According to an interview with Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) on February 23, 2002: ” ‘The estimate is that there are one hundred or more al-Qaeda operatives inside the United States, some of whom have been here for a considerable period of time.’ ” – Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., Page 242 […]
2/22/2002
Although the Defense Intelligence Agency noted that on February 22, 2002, and again in July 2002, that Al Qaeda commander Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi might have fabricated information due to his forceful interrogations, “None of these doubts were shared with Secretary of State [Colin] Powell in the fall of 2002 as America weighed whether to go […]
2/22/2002
“The DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] report [of February 22, 2002] questioned the reliability of an allegedly high-value al-Qa’ida prisoner, held in United States custody [whose confessions by torture would be used in building the case for the Iraq invasion and then subsequently discredited]: ‘This is the first report from Ibn al-Shaykh [al-Libi] in which he […]
2/22/2002
“The report that Iraq had approached Niger to discuss a yellowcake purchase came originally from the British, but when the CIA sent former ambassador Joseph Wilson to Niger to check it out, he said that none of his contacts confirmed it. He added that the Niger uranium mines were operated by the French, and it […]
2/20/2002
Regarding the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, an Agence France-Presse article on February 20, 2002, stated: “Off the record, of course, senior Saudi officials have also suggested that the United States has ‘overstayed its welcome.’ ” – Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., Page 237 […]
2/20/2002
“…On February 20 [2002], four days after the finding [approving regime change in Iraq] was signed, a CIA survey team secretly entered northern Iraq in the Kurdish area to prepare for the deployment of CIA paramilitary teams that would be called NILE, Northern Iraq Liaison Elements.” – Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, Pages 108-109 […]