3/8/2002

A memo titled ‘Iraq: Options Paper‘ was written by the British government Overseas and Defence Secretariat on March 8, 2002, and leaked to the press in May 2005 as part of the Downing Street Memos. It stated: ” ‘The US administration has lost faith in containment and is now considering regime change [in Iraq]. The […]

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3/7/2002

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “418. At the Cabinet meeting on 7 March 2002, Mr Blair concluded: ‘… the concerns expressed in discussion were justified. It was important that the United States did not appear to be acting unilaterally. It was critically important to reinvigorate the Middle East Peace […]

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3/7/2002

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary:” “[British] Cabinet discusses Iraq strategy.”  – Commissioned by the Prime Minister The Right Honourable Gordon Brown MP, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary,” IraqInquiry.org.uk, March 7, 2002 […]

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3/7/2002

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary:” “At [UK] Cabinet on 7 March, Mr Blair and Mr Straw emphasised that no decisions had been taken and Cabinet was not being asked to take decisions. Cabinet endorsed the conclusion that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes posed a threat to peace […]

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3/6/2002

Vice President Dick Cheney was preparing to visit Egypt, Oman, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, Israel, and Turkey. “On March 6 [2002], [Central Command leader General Tommy] Franks briefed Cheney in Washington. The general had a top secret paper that he had worked out with [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld on what was […]

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3/5/2002

“A few days later [early March, 2002], [former ambassador Joe] Wilson returned from Niger and told CIA officials that he had found no evidence to support the story about the alleged uranium deal [with Iraq]. By now the Niger reports had been discredited more than half a dozen times–by the French in 2001, by the […]

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3/5/2002

“Freedom of Information Act requests revealed [on March 5, 2002] that, as part of its deliberations, the [Cheney Energy] task force reviewed a series of lists and maps outlining Iraq’s entire oil productive capacity. These maps include detailed descriptions of all of Iraq’s oil fields, oil pipelines, refineries, and tanker terminals. Two lists entitled ‘Foreign […]

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3/5/2002

“On March 5, 2002, two CIA officers debriefed [envoy to Niger, Joseph] Wilson at his home. …The former ambassador summarized his discussions with the ex-Nigerian leaders and explained his view that a uranium deal of this kind [500 tons of yellowcake to be sold to Iraq] would be nearly impossible to pull off. One of […]

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3/4/2002

“A high-level intelligence assessment by the Bush administration concluded in early 2002 that the sale of uranium from Niger to Iraq was ‘unlikely’ because of a host of economic, diplomatic, and logistical obstacles, according to a secret State Department memo [on March 4, 2002].”  – Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold, Page 235 […]

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3/4/2002

“While a handful of U.S. soldiers monitored the Battle of Tora Bora [Afghanistan] and guided bombing missions [in November-December 2001], they left the actual ground fighting to local forces, hired in haste. The local forces had their own agendas. As a result, America failed in its objective to capture Osama bin Laden and many al […]

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