President George W. Bush calls for new Palestinian Leadership, urging them to embrace democracy and join in the War on Terror: “I’ve said in the past that nations are either with us or against us in the war on terror. To be counted on the side of peace, nations must act. Every leader actually committed to […]
6/21/2002
The CIA issued a classified assessment on June 21, 2002, titled ‘Iraq and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship.’ “The assessment noted that it was ‘purposefully aggressive in seeking to draw connections, on the assumption that any indication of a relationship between these hostile elements would carry great dangers for the United States.’ The paper concluded […]
6/21/2002
“According to the [June 21] 2002 CIA report, ‘Iraq and al Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship‘: ‘Mamdouh Mahmud Ahmed Salim, aka Abu Hajer al-Iraqi, a top al Qaeda logistician now jailed in the United States–had a good relationship with Iraqi intelligence and at some time before mid-1995 went on an al Qaeda mission to Iraq […]
6/21/2002
“A CIA report [released on June 21, 2002] entitled ‘Iraq and Al Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship‘ notes the ‘many critical gaps’ in knowledge of Iraqi links to Al Qaeda due to ‘limited reporting’ and the ‘questionable reliability of many of our sources.’ It states that ‘Reporting is contradictory on hijacker Mohamed Atta’s alleged trip […]
6/21/2002
The CIA’s report titled ‘Iraq and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship‘ was distributed on June 21, 2002. It said: ” ‘Reporting is contradictory on hijacker Mohammed Atta’s alleged trip to Prague and meeting with an Iraqi intelligence officer, and we have not verified his travels [censored].’ ” – Philip Taylor, The War in Iraq, Page […]
6/21/2002
In its report titled ‘Iraq and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship‘ that was distributed on June 21, 2002, the CIA stated: ” ‘Some analysts concur with the assessment that intelligence reporting provides *no conclusive evidence of cooperation on specific terrorist operations,* but believe that the available signs support a conclusion that Iraq has had sporadic, […]
6/21/2002
The CIA’s Middle East analysis “took the view that a secular, authoritative regime like Saddam’s would not form an alliance with a fundamentalist group like Al Qaeda. The agency’s experts also discounted reports that Mohamed Atta, who planned the 9/11 attacks, had met in Prague with a head of Iraqi intelligence. In June [21] 2002, […]
6/18/2002
On June 18, 2002, “the CIA had issued another report concluding that the interaction between Saddam and bin Laden appeared to be ‘more akin to activity between rival intelligence services, each trying to use the relationship to its own advantage.’ “ – Peter Bergen, The Longest War, Pages 139-140 […]
6/15/2002
“From March until June 2002, the FBI began a rapport-building method of dealing with [al Qaeda operations chief] Abu Zubaydah… According to [FBI Agent Ali] Soufan, FBI’s top experts on al-Qaeda and fluent in Arabic, he and [FBI Agent Steve] Gaudin were able to gain the confidence of Abu Zubaydah with the use of proven […]
6/15/2002
Secretary of Defense Donald “Rumsfeld has articulated the justification for preemptive action [in Iraq] by stating [before NATO officials in Brussels, Belgium, in June 2002] that the ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence of weapons of mass destruction.’ “ [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] – Foreign Affairs, […]