8/1/2002

“Testifying before Congress on August 1, 2002, Matthew Levitt, a senior fellow with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, noted that Tarik Hamdi, an IIIT [Saudi-based charity International Institute for Islamic Thought] employee, had personally provided Osama bin Laden with batteries for his satellite phone, a critical link in the stateless world that bin […]

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7/31/2002

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “101. When Mr Blair spoke to President Bush on 31 July the ‘central issue of a casus belli’ and the for further work on the optimal route to achieve that was discussed. Mr Blair said that he wanted to explore whether to explore whether […]

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7/31/2002

Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 31, 2002, “The former head of Iraq’s nuclear programs, Khidir Hamza, adds that the window of opportunity to halt Saddam’s WMD efforts ‘is closing down possibly within the next 2-3 years.’ ”  – Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq, Page 80 […]

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7/31/2002

U.N. Weapons Inspector Richard Butler “told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [in testimony on July 31, 2002] that, years of weapons inspections notwithstanding, ‘Iraq is well into CW [chemical weapons] production and may well be in the process of BW [biological weapons] production. With more than 10 tons of uranium and one ton of slightly […]

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7/31/2002

When asked about his Iraq war planning at a cabinet meeting on July 31, 2002, President Bush said: ” ‘The stated mission is regime change,’… ‘Our intent is serious. There are no war plans on my desk. I believe there is a casus belli and that the doctrine of preemption applies. We won’t do anything […]

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7/31/2002

“Appearing on CNN on July 31, 2002, she [author Laurie Mylroie] told anchor Aaron Brown that [President] Bush had already decided to get rid of Saddam…war was the only option. Fortunately, she noted, there already was a group ready and capable to lead Iraq to democracy following a military invasion: Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress.” […]

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7/28/2002

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary:” “93. Mr Blair’s Note to President Bush of 28 July [2002] sought to persuade President Bush to use the UN to build a coalition for action by seeking a partnership between the UK and the US and setting out a framework for action. 94. The […]

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7/28/2002

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “Mr Blair sends a Note to President Bush beginning ‘I will be with you, whatever’.”  – Commissioned by the Prime Minister The Right Honourable Gordon Brown MP, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary,” IraqInquiry.org.uk, July 28, 2002 […]

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7/28/2002

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary:” “801. -Mr Blair’s Note to President Bush of 28 July sought to persuade President Bush to use the UN to build a coalition for action by seeking a partnership with the US and setting out a framework for action. … -Mr Blair’s Note, which […]

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7/26/2002

Mr. Blair advised that there would be “formidable obstacles” to securing a new UN resolution incorporating an ultimatum without convincing evidence of a greatly increased threat from Iraq. A great deal more work would be needed to clarify what the UK was seeking and how its objective might best be achieved.  – House of Commons, […]

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