In analyzing the NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) completed on October 1, 2002, then-CIA Director George Tenet said: “An NIE had never been relied upon as a basis for going to war, and, in my view, the decision to invade Iraq was not solely predicated on this one. But if we had done a better job […]
10/1/2002
The CIA’s classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, delivered to Congress on October 1, 2002, “offered bold and definitive conclusions in its ‘key judgments’: Iraq, it said, ‘has chemical and biological weapons’ and ‘is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.’ …Deeper in the NIE, there was information that undercut those stark […]
10/1/2002
“The National Intelligence Estimate that was provided to Congress in October [1] 2002 reported that Saddam had up to several dozen Scud missiles with ranges of 400 to 550 miles. The threat that Saddam might fire Scuds with WMD warheads at Israel had been one of the Pentagon’s biggest worries and extensive training had been […]
10/1/2002
According to the National Intelligence Estimate of October 1, 2002: “The only situation in which Saddam might take the ‘extreme step’ of assisting an Islamic terrorist group like Al Qaeda in attacking the United States would be one in which Saddam had been cornered and felt the United States was on the verge of upending […]
10/1/2002
“When the classified assessment [that was requested by October 1, 2002, by vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee Senator Bob Graham (D-FL)] was finally submitted, the conclusions about Iraq’s WMD went a step further than those in the December 2000 report [a National Intelligence Estimate titled ‘Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities’]. Much of the […]
10/1/2002
“The National Intelligence Estimate of October [1] 2002 stated, ‘Iraq does not yet have a nuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one…’ ” – Philip Taylor, The War in Iraq, Page 48 […]
10/1/2002
“On Tuesday, October 1 [2002], [President] Bush and [Vice President Dick] Cheney met with a dozen members of the House International Relations Committee in the White House Cabinet Room. ‘We cannot let history judge us and ask where was George W. Bush and Dick Cheney …People out there say you cannot fight in Afghanistan and […]
10/1/2002
“The most important prewar intelligence report that the Bush administration relied upon to justify its going to war in Iraq was the…October 1, 2002, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), a CIA report that utilized the input of every intelligence agency in the federal government…and was classified ‘Top Secret.’ The NIE report (titled ‘Iraq’s Continuing Programs for […]
9/28/2002
While pushing for the Homeland Security Bill, President George W. Bush had this to say: “Saddam Hussein has got a choice, and that is, he can disarm. There’s no negotiations, by the way. There’s nothing to negotiate with him. He told the world he would disarm 11 years ago, and he’s lied to the world. (Applause.) It’s […]
9/28/2002
“In his weekly radio address [on September 28, 2002], President Bush says the Iraqi regime ‘has longstanding and continuing ties to terrorist groups, and there are Al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq.’ ” – Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold, Page 249 […]