” ‘We reject the condescending view that freedom will not grow in the soil of the Middle East–or that Muslims somehow do not share the desire to be free,’ [National Security Advisor] Condoleezza Rice said last October [1, 2002].” – Lawrence F. Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq, Page 103 […]
10/1/2002
The October 1, 2002 National Intelligence Estimate “claimed that there were multiple sources for the mobile germ warfare claim [in Iraq]. In fact, [Iraqi informant] Curveball had produced scores of reports on this while two other sources produced one report each, so this was a gross misrepresentation. In any event, one of the sources, an […]
10/1/2002
“The October [1] 2002 National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction concluded that Iraq has ‘transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin agents.’ The NIE said it had multiple sources for that assertion, but in fact it was based almost entirely on [Iraqi defector] Curveball.” – James Risen, State of War, Page […]
10/1/2002
“And the NIE [national intelligence estimate] of October [1] 2002, entitled ‘Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,’ stated that Iraq had been ‘vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake’ (the ‘yellowcake’ a reference to the Niger claim). Based partly on this NIE, Congress voted overwhelmingly and across party lines on October 11, […]
10/1/2002
In analyzing the NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) completed on October 1, 2002, in terms of its importance to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, then-CIA Director George Tenet wrote: “An NIE had never been relied upon as a basis for going to war, and, in my view, the decision to invade Iraq was not solely predicated […]
10/1/2002
“The heart of the [CIA] agency’s case [in their October 1, 2002, National Intelligence Estimate] was built around four factual claims–that Iraq was trying to buy a kind of uranium ore called yellowcake in Niger; that Iraq was trying to buy thousands of aluminum tubes that could be used as rotors in a centrifuge to […]
10/1/2002
“Before the war the CIA expressed ‘high confidence’ that once American soldiers had the run of Iraq they would find stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, mobile laboratories to make more, vigorous programs to buy uranium and develop atomic bombs, and much else confronting the United States with a ‘gathering threat’ or ‘growing danger’–words used […]
10/1/2002
“[W]hen the Senate Intelligence Committee reviewed the NIE [National Intelligence Estimate of October 1, 2002] in light of evidence that became available after the war, it came to the conclusion that the collective wisdom of the U.S. intelligence community, as represented in the estimate, had been stunningly wrong. ‘Most of the major key judgments [in […]
10/1/2002
In the National Intelligence Estimate of October 1, 2002, in a textbox titled ‘State Department/INR Alternative View of Iraq’s Nuclear program,’ the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) declared: ” ‘The activities we have detected [in Iraq] do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider […]
10/1/2002
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is a division of the State Department that has clearance to view intelligence gathered by all other agencies. “At the end of the Key Judgments section of the NIE [National Intelligence Estimate of October 1, 2002], a textbox was included, with the title ‘State/INR Alternative View.’ ‘In INR’s […]