“On October 2 [2002], the White House held a Rose Garden ceremony…to announce a resolution had been finalized [giving President Bush permission to wage war with Iraq]. …[Democratic House Leader Dick] Gephardt’s [MO] decision to back the president’s resolution killed [Foreign Relations Committee Member Senator Joseph] Biden’s [D-DE] bipartisan alternative in the Senate and guaranteed […]
10/1/2002
“The United States had military commands with responsibility for every part of the world but not for the United States. (Northern Command was created in October [1] 2002 to fill that void.)” – Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor, Page 111 […]
10/1/2002
According to the Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005: ” ‘The October [1] 2002 NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] reflected the shift from the late-1990s assessments that Iraq could have biological weapons [BW] to the definitive conclusion that Iraq ‘has’ biological weapons, and that its BW program was larger and more advanced […]
10/1/2002
“On October 1 [2002], Baghdad agreed that [UN weapons] inspectors could return [to Iraq], and the UN weapons team agreed to await further instructions from the Security Council before taking up its chores.” – Todd S. Purdum and The New York Times Staff, A Time of Our Choosing, Pages 59-60 […]
10/1/2002
“The most contentious of the NSA [National Security Agency] SIGINT [signals intelligence] material used in the [October 1, 2002] NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] alleged that the Iraqis were developing unmanned drones for the purpose of delivering chemical or biological weapons to targets in the United States. This claim was largely based on an inferential reading […]
10/1/2002
“The NIE [National Intelligence Estimate, released on October 1, 2002] stated with ‘high confidence’ that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program since the U.N. weapons inspectors had left Iraq in 1998, adding that Iraq ‘probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.’ According to former NSA [National Security Agency] and CIA analysts, NSA […]
10/1/2002
” ‘I haven’t made up my mind we’re going to war with Iraq,’ he [President Bush] said at an October [1, 2002] press conference. ‘I’ve made up my mind we need to disarm the man [Saddam Hussein]. …There needs to be a strong new [United Nations] resolution in order for us to make it clear […]
10/1/2002
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of October 1, 2002 said: “that the United States had a ‘high confidence’ that: ‘*Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs contrary to U.S. resolutions. *We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs. *Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles. […]
10/1/2002
On October 1, 2002, “CIA officials had referred to the [Niger/Iraq] uranium claim in the classified ninety-page National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons programs.” However, “the CIA had included as a footnote to the assessment that the uranium allegations were ‘highly dubious.’ ” – Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone, Page 216 […]
10/1/2002
The CIA’s October 1, 2002 “National Intelligence Estimate, had been requested in early September by senators on the [Senate Select] committee [on Intelligence] who wanted written information to help them decide whether to vote for the war resolution that would soon be before Congress. In response, the CIA crashed out an assessment in nineteen days–rather […]