10/17/2002

“…although terrorism had been NSA’s [National Security Agency’s] top priority since the August 1998 East Africa embassy bombings, the agency’s director, General Michael Hayden, later admitted [before the Joint Inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on October 17, 2002] that he had at least five […]

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10/17/2002

In his prepared testimony before the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002, CIA Director George Tenet made it clear, “that in every case where [then-President Bill] Clinton’s Cabinet discussed cruise missile strikes, a decisive problem was the lack of absolute certainty that bin Laden was present. Tenet concluded that the CIA’s strategy against bin […]

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10/17/2002

“CIA Director George Tenet testified under oath [to Congress’ Joint Inquiry into the September 11 attacks] on October 17, 2002, that during the 1980s, ‘While we knew of him, we have no record of any direct U.S. government contact with bin Laden at that time.’ ”  – Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, Pages 598-599 […]

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10/17/2002

According to Congress’ Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks, testimony of CIA Counterterrorist Center Director Cofer Black on September 26, 2002, and CIA Director George Tenet on October 17, 2002, author Steve Coll wrote: “Bin Laden moved within Saudi intelligence’s compartmented operations, outside of CIA eyesight. CIA archives contain no record of any direct contact […]

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10/17/2002

On October 17, 2002, Director of the National Security Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, “provided Congress and the public with a sobering reality check in testimony before the joint congressional committees on the state of intelligence prior to 9/11. ‘Sadly, NSA [National Security Agency] had no SIGINT [signals intelligence] suggesting that al Qaeda was specifically […]

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10/16/2002

President George W. Bush, after signing the Iraq Resolution: “When Iraq has a government committed to the freedom and well-being of its people, America, along with many other nations, will share a responsibility to help Iraq reform and prosper. And we will meet our responsibilities. That’s our pledge to the Iraqi people. Like the members of Congress […]

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10/16/2002

“On October 16 [2002], Saddam staged a sham referendum on his tenure, which Iraqi officials claimed he won by a perfect 100 percent of the vote…”  – Todd S. Purdum and The New York Times Staff, A Time of Our Choosing, Page 60 […]

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10/16/2002

“Upon signing the congressional resolution [to use force in Iraq] on October 16 [2002], [President] Bush assuaged the fears of those who thought it was a declaration of war. ‘I have not ordered the use of force,’ he said. ‘I hope the use of force will not become necessary. Hopefully this can be done peacefully. […]

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10/16/2002

In Iraq, “In October [16] 2002, Saddam got 100 percent of the vote in a nationwide referendum for another seven-year term, which he described as a show of the Iraqi people’s defiance of the US war threats.”  – China Daily Staff, “Profile: Former Iraqi Leader Saddam Hussein,” China Daily, June 30, 2004 […]

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10/15/2002

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary:” “811. … -The MOD [Ministry of Defense] advised in October that the UK was at risk of being excluded from US plans unless it offered ground forces, ‘Package 3’, on the same basis as air and maritime forces. That could also significantly reduce the […]

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