“On October 18 [2002], [National Security Agency (NSA) Director] General [Michael] Hayden went on NSA’s television network to announce that war with Iraq was coming soon and that NSA had to take immediate steps to get ready for the impending invasion. He noted that ‘a SIGINT [signals intelligence] agency cannot wait for a political decision’ […]
10/17/2002
From “Terrorist Financing–Report of an Independent Task Force,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 17, 2002: “For years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia have been the most important source of funds for al-Qaeda. And for years, Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to this problem.” – William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, […]
10/17/2002
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. It read: “The US Government had no official presence in Afghanistan, and relations with the Taliban were seriously strained. Both factors made it more difficult to gain access to Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida personnel.” – CIA, […]
10/17/2002
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. It concluded: “Total success against such targets [as al-Qa’ida] is impossible. Some attackers will continue to get through us.” – CIA, “Written Statement for the Record of the DCI,” (before the Joint Inquiry Committee, CIA), The […]
10/17/2002
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. It read: “The Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Board…issued several threat advisories during the summer 2001. These advisories–the fruit of painstaking analytical work–contained phrases like ‘al-Qa’ida is most likely to attempt spectacular attacks resulting in numerous casualties,’ and […]
10/17/2002
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. It read: “In the months leading up to 9/11, we were convinced Bin Ladin meant to attack Americans, meant to kill large numbers, and that the attack could be at home, abroad, or both. And we […]
10/17/2002
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. Regarding surveillance on future 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, it read: “There are at least two points before August 2001 when these individuals were on our scope with sufficient information to have been watchlisted. […]
10/17/2002
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. It read: “The US Government had no official presence in Afghanistan, and relations with the Taliban were seriously strained. Both factors made it more difficult to gain access to Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida personnel.” – CIA, […]
10/17/2002
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet released a written statement for the Joint Inquiry Committee on October 17, 2002. It read: “After Bin Ladin had left Sudan we learned that al-Qa’ida had attempted to acquire material used in pursuing a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) capability and had hired a Middle Eastern physicist to work […]
10/17/2002
“Former CIA Director George Tenet has said [on October 17, 2002] that before 9/11, seventy suspected terrorists were rendered, and these actions undoubtedly thwarted a number of plots in the making.” – Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack, Page 257 […]