“In an informal National Intelligence Estimate [in January 2003], intelligence agencies unanimously conclude that Saddam was unlikely to attack the United States unless attacked first.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] – Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold, Page 256 […]
1/15/2003
The National Intelligence Council’s January 2003 report, titled ‘Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq,’ “predicted that ‘The building of an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult, and probably turbulent process. …[A] post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each other unless […]
1/15/2003
“As of January [2003], NSA [National Security Agency] was also intercepting the communications traffic (calls, e-mails, cables, etc.) of the United Nations’ chief weapons inspector, Dr. Hans Blix, and his deputies. According to Bob Woodward of the Washington Post, President Bush was convinced that the Swedish diplomat was saying one thing in public and quite […]
1/15/2003
“In January 2003, NSA [National Security Agency] was tasked by the White House to monitor the communications of a surprisingly large number of international organizations, all of whom were key players standing in the way of the Bush administration’s strenuous efforts to convince the world community to join the U.S. and Britain and its so-called […]
1/15/2003
“A declassified CIA report from January 2003, called ‘Iraqi Support for Terrorism,’ concluded: ‘Iraq continues to be a safe haven, transit point, or operational node for groups and individuals who direct violence against the United States, Israel, and other allies. Iraq has a long history of supporting terrorism. During the last four decades, it has […]
1/15/2003
“A joint study [in January 2003] by the Council on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University warned of possible anarchy and the need for the U.S. military to quickly turn to humanitarian efforts and law enforcement [following an invasion of Iraq].” [The 15th of the month […]
1/15/2003
” ‘We know that the president [Bush] wants to keep North Korea out of the way so he can concentrate on Iraq,’ a senior British official in close consultations with the White House noted in January 2003. ‘They have remitted the issue to State [Department]…so that it does not get in the way’ of the […]
1/15/2003
“In a letter intercepted in January 2003 and later released by the CIA, [future al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-] Zarqawi called the Shia ‘the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom.’ Quoting from [Kurdish Sunni scholar] Ibin Taymiyya, he warned: ‘Beware of the Shia, fight […]
1/15/2003
“By January 2003, NSA [National Security Agency] was turning its giant ears toward the undecided members of the UN Security Council. Three months earlier, largely as a result of its avalanche of phony intelligence, the Bush administration won the support of both houses of Congress for a war with Iraq. With the Country largely convinced, […]
1/15/2003
“By January 2003, when the Bush administration was ratcheting up its claims of Iraq’s imminent threat, the intelligence reports were continuing to say the exact opposite–that Saddam Hussein had no intention of attacking the United States, unless he was about to be attacked first. The intelligence assessment found that ‘Saddam probably will not initiate hostilities […]