“Hans Blix, the chief U.N. weapons inspector … told the [U.N.] Security Council [on January 27, 2003] that ‘Iraq has decided in principle’ to cooperate on process when it came to granting access to sites and providing support services for U.N. inspectors. ‘Information provided by member states tells us about the movement and concealment of missiles […]
1/27/2003
“The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had just issued a report taking issue with [Bush] Administration claims that Iraq had an active nuclear program. ‘We have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapon program since the elimination of the program in the 1990’s,’ Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the agency, […]
1/27/2003
“At a NSC [National Security Council] meeting on January 27, 2003, [CIA Director] George Tenet was given a hard-copy draft of the State of the Union address [President] Bush was to deliver the next day. That day, Tenet returned to CIA headquarters and, without even reading the speech, gave a copy to an assistant who […]
1/27/2003
On January 27, 2003, “Mohammed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), publicly declared that the IAEA inspectors who had been on the ground in Iraq during the months before the invasion had ‘found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program since the elimination of the program in the […]
1/27/2003
On January 27, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans “Blix reported ‘no convincing evidence’ that Iraq’s stocks of deadly anthrax were ever destroyed, while there was ‘strong evidence’ that Iraq produced more anthrax than it had admitted ‘and that at least some of this was retained.’ Blix also said that Iraq possessed 659 kilograms of […]
1/27/2003
“On January 27 [2003], the [CIA’s] Berlin station replied that German intelligence ‘has not been able to verify [Iraqi defector] [Curveball’s] reporting. …The source himself is problematical. …[T]o use information from another liaison service’s source whose information cannot be verified on such an important, key topic should take the most serious consideration.’ ” – Michael […]
1/27/2003
“On January 27 [2003], [CIA Director George] Tenet was at a National Security Council meeting and the White House handed him a copy of a near-final version of the [upcoming State of the Union] speech, which was now loaded with references to assorted intelligence material and which included one sentence on the uranium-shopping-in-Africa claim. He […]
1/27/2003
“…on January 27 [2003], the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] reported to the UN Security Council that it had found no evidence of an active nuclear weapons program in Iraq. The aluminum tubes, the agency reported, appeared to be ‘consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq’– for artillery rockets.” – Michael Isikoff and David Corn, […]
1/27/2003
” ‘Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance–not even today–of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace,’ the UNMOVIC [United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission] director [Hans Blix] told the [UN] Security […]
1/27/2003
Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans “Blix warned that the deficiencies [in Iraq’s compliance with U.N. weapons inspections] were so grave as to suggest that Saddam did not grasp the gravity of the situation. Iraq, Blix told the Security Council on January 27 [2003], did not seem to have accepted ‘the disarmament which was demanded of […]