On January 31, 2003, President Bush “had a two hour meeting in the Oval Office with British prime minister Tony Blair and six of Bush’s and Blair’s top aides. …In a five-page memo stamped ‘extremely sensitive’ dated January 31, 2003, that summarized the discussion at the meeting…[Blair’s Chief Foreign Policy Advisor, David] Manning wrote that […]
1/31/2003
The leaked memo written by U.K. Chief Foreign Policy Advisor David Manning on January 31, 2003, discussed that day’s meeting between President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair. “The memo indicates the two leaders envisioned a quick victory and a transition to a new Iraqi government that would be complicated, but manageable. Mr. Bush […]
1/31/2003
“The memo, written [by U.K. Chief Foreign Policy Advisor David Manning] on 31 January 2003, almost two months before the invasion [of Iraq] and seen by the Observer, confirms that as the two men [President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair] became increasingly aware UN inspectors would fail to find weapons of mass destruction […]
1/31/2003
While the U.S. and the U.K. were pushing for a second UN resolution to condemn Iraq, “the president [Bush] was certain that war was inevitable. During a private two-hour meeting in the Oval Office on Jan. 31, 2003, he made clear to Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain that he was determined to invade Iraq […]
1/31/2003
President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on January 31, 2003. “Blair told Bush that he needed to get a second UN resolution [authorizing military action against Iraq]. …Bush was set against a second resolution. …But Blair had the winning argument. It was necessary for him politically. It was no more complicated than […]
1/31/2003
“On January 31 [2003], [President] Bush met with [British Prime Minister Tony] Blair in the Oval Office for two hours. Blair had a request. He explained to Bush that he needed a second UN resolution that explicitly authorized military action against Iraq. …Bush told Blair that regardless of what happened at the United Nations or […]
1/31/2003
“On January 31 [2003], the State Department’s INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research], which had been vetting the work-in-progress draft [for Secretary of State Colin Powell’s upcoming UN Speech], sent Powell a memo noting that thirty-eight allegations in the speech were ‘weak’ or ‘unsubstantiated.’ …Since not all of the INR’s objections were heeded, Powell would […]
1/31/2003
“By the end of January 2003, the [War College] Strategic Studies Institute produced a report that noted that ‘ethnic, tribal and religious schisms could produce civil war or fracture the state [Iraq] after Saddam is deposed.’ ” Additionally, ” ‘The possibility of the United States winning the war and losing the peace in Iraq is […]
1/30/2003
In The Wall Street Journal on January 30, 2003, “The leaders of eight European countries–Spain, Portugal, Italy, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland, Denmark, and the Czech Republic–published an article saying they stood as one with President Bush on Iraq.” – Karl Rove, Courage and Consequence, Page 303 […]
1/30/2003
On January 30, 2003, British politician Clare Short said, in a debate at the House of Commons: ” ‘Saddam Hussein’s regime must know that the world will remain united behind the authority of the United Nations, that he will be forced by one means or another to dismantle his weapons of mass destruction and that, […]