“In [Secretary of State] Colin Powell’s presentation to the United Nations [on February 5, 2003] he said that ‘an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer [code-named Curveball] actually was present during biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. Twelve technicians died from exposure to biological agents.’ But […]
2/5/2003
In his address to the UN Security Council on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell said: ” ‘There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. …Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. …We have more than a decade of proof that Saddam Hussein […]
2/5/2003
“Speaking before the United Nations [on February 5, 2003], Secretary of State Colin Powell, citing intelligence gathered from an Iraqi source, said that a bin Laden associate ‘had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gasses.’ ” – Richard Miniter, Losing Bin Laden, Page 238 […]
2/5/2003
“Working from a draft prepared by [Vice President Dick] Cheney’s office, [Secretary of State] Colin Powell made the tubes [made of anodized aluminum, which Iraq was supposedly attempting to acquire to use for uranium enrichment] a centerpiece of his speech in the UN Security Council on Feb. 5, 2003, ridiculing the notion that anyone would […]
2/5/2003
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the UN of February 5, 2003, “also made a great deal of [al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-] Zarqawi’s alleged connection to the radical Kurdish jihadist group, Ansar al Islam, but later analysis has shown few ties with this group or its base camp in Kurdistan. […]
2/4/2003
According to information from the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, delivered on July 7, 2004: “On the day before Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address before the UN Security Council [February 4, 2003]…a [anonymous] military intelligence officer became alarmed that Powell was relying […]
2/4/2003
“On February 4 [2003], [Les, the Defense Department doctor who had examined Curveball] sent an email to the deputy chief of the CIA’s Joint Task Force on Iraq: ‘I do have a concern with the validity of the information based on ‘CURVE BALL.’ He noted there had been…questions about whether ‘in fact, CURVE BALL was […]
2/3/2003
“On February 3 [2003], two days before [Secretary of State Colin] Powell was to go to New York, he sketched out his briefing to the president [Bush] at an NSC [National Security Council] meeting. ‘We have sources for everything,’ Powell confidently told the President. If Powell felt duped or misled about any aspect of his […]
2/3/2003
“On February 3, 2003, the White House press spokesman, Ari Fleischer, responded to a question about the president’s [Bush’s] views on the exile of Saddam: ‘Well, as the president said, if Saddam Hussein were to leave Iraq and to take, as the President put it, his henchmen with him, that would be a very desirable […]
2/3/2003
On February 3, 2003, “When Les, the Defense Department medical doctor and biological weapons specialist detailed to the CIA’s Counterproliferation Division, read a draft of [Secretary of State Colin] Powell’s [upcoming] speech [to the UN Security Council], he was upset. He had gone to Germany in 2000 to draw blood from [Iraqi informant] Curveball [whose […]