2/15/2003

“George Tenet, the CIA director, told Congress in February 2003: ‘Baghdad is expanding its civilian chemical industry in ways that could be diverted quickly to chemical weapons production.’ “ [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – Con Coughlin, Saddam: His Rise and Fall, Page 320 […]

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2/15/2003

In an undated interview conducted by journalist Ron Suskind, former head of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service Sir Richard Dearlove “confirms that [British Secret Agent Michael] Shipster’s precious haul of intelligence [regarding Iraq’s lack of WMD] was passed immediately, by February [2003], to Washington. Everyone ‘at the top’ knew all about it–he and [CIA Director George] […]

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2/15/2003

In an undated interview conducted by journalist Ron Suskind, former head of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, Sir Richard “Dearlove had trouble nailing down the exact date of the meeting [between British secret agent Michael Shipster and Iraqi intelligence chief Tahir Jalil Habbush] and hints that there may have been several. He’s sure, though, that one […]

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2/14/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “162. In their reports to the Security Council on February 14: -Dr Blix reported that UNMOVIC had not found any weapons of mass destruction and the items that were not accounted for might not exist, but Iraq needed to provide the evidence to answer […]

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2/14/2003

In a statement to the UN Security Council on February 14, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix said “that UNMOVIC [UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission] had not found any weapons of mass destruction, only a small number of empty chemical munitions. There were no smoking guns to report. Another matter–and one of equal […]

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2/14/2003

At a UN Security Council meeting on February 14, 2003, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said: ” ‘I hope and believe that a peaceful solution to this crisis may still be possible. But this will require a dramatic and immediate change by Saddam.’ “  – Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq, Page 180 […]

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2/14/2003

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld delivered a speech titled ‘Beyond Nation Building’ in New York on February 14, 2003. ” ‘Well-intentioned foreigners’ who practice nation-building, he said, ‘come in with international solutions to local problems’ and ‘can create a dependency’ that produces ‘unintended adverse side effects.’ A ‘long-term foreign presence in a country can be […]

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2/14/2003

The Blix Report, released by chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix on February 14, 2003, “described the finding of imported material for longer-range missiles in breach of UN resolutions; the difficulties of tracking down the anthrax and VX nerve agent, without greater Iraqi cooperation; and it concluded: ‘If Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in […]

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2/14/2003

“Saddam [Hussein] had presented a massive document to the UN [in December 2002], claiming that he had no WMD. [Chief UN weapons inspector] Hans Blix had corroborated this, by stating to the Security Council on 14 February, 2003, that the UN team had found no WMD in Iraq. [President] Bush rejected these findings, however, insisting […]

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2/14/2003

“By February 14 [2003], after having combed through more than three hundred sites in Iraq unimpeded for eleven weeks, U.N. inspectors had still found nothing, which only proved, said the neocons, that they were dupes. ‘U.N. weapons inspectors are being seriously deceived,’ declared [Defense Policy Board Adviser] Richard Perle. ‘It reminds me of the way […]

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