2/26/2003

” ‘Even if we succeed in what you are asking for [killing or capturing bin Laden],’ [Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah] Massoud told the CIA delegation, as his aide and translator Abdullah recalled it [in a February 26, 2003, interview], ‘that will not solve the bigger problem that is growing.’ The CIA team leader and […]

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2/25/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “172. On 25 February, Mr Blair told the House of Commons that the intelligence was ‘clear’ that Saddam Hussein continued ‘to believe that his weapons of mass destruction programme is essential both for internal repression and for external aggression’. It was also ‘essential to […]

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2/25/2003

“On February 25, 2003, GEN Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, was testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee when Senator Carl Levin [D-MI] candidly asked him what kind of manpower would be necessary to keep the peace in a postwar Iraq. ‘Something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers would be […]

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2/25/2003

On February 25, 2003, “Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki had told a Senate hearing that a U.S. force ‘on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers’ would be required to occupy Iraq after the initial combat victory. ‘We’re talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that’s fairly significant, with the kinds […]

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2/25/2003

“U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 25, 2003, that several hundred thousand troops would be needed to sustain security in Iraq in the period after the war. Shinseki echoed the views of other defense analysts developed some eighteen months earlier. But [Secretary of Defense Donald] […]

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2/25/2003

“On February 25, [2003, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric] Shinseki and his fellow chiefs went before the Senate Armed Services Committee, which was probing the preparations for the all but certain [Iraq] war. During the proceedings, Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat, asked Shinseki how many troops would be needed to control Iraq after […]

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2/25/2003

In a speech to Parliament on February 25, 2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said: ” ‘We knew he [Saddam Hussein] had used these weapons [of mass destruction] against his own people, and against a foreign country, Iran, but we had not known that in addition to chemical weapons, he had biological weapons which he […]

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2/24/2003

“On February 24, [2003,] the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain proposed the resolution on Iraq. But most members of the Security Council declared they would not vote [on it] at all. They were opposed to what they saw as unjustified regime change, and they believed there was no long-term benefit to getting rid […]

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2/24/2003

President George W. Bush clarifying the War on Terror: “The war on terror is more than just chasing down shadowy terrorist networks. The war on terror is recognizing that weapons of mass destruction, in the hands of brutal dictators, also threatens the American people. I’ve come to the conclusion that the risk of doing nothing far […]

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2/24/2003

“On February 24 [2003], the UK, U.S. and Spain circulated a draft resolution [to the UN Security Council] ‘in blue,’ which is a proposal that is not given a document number and on which no action or voting is yet asked. It asserted that Iraq had failed to comply with November’s Resolution 1441 in that […]

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