“[I]n his report to the UN on 7 March [2003], here is what [chief UN weapons inspector] Hans Blix said about Iraq’s cooperation. Having stated that it was increasing, which, as he put it in somewhat of an understatement, ‘may well be due to outside pressure,’ he then addressed the matter of interviews and documents: […]
3/7/2003
On March 7, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans “Blix informed the [UN] Security Council that Baghdad had tried to persuade the UN team that Al Samoud II missiles, which it had already declared, fell ‘within the permissible range’ set by the council. However, a panel of international experts had reached the opposite conclusion. Blix […]
3/7/2003
“President Bush…asked the country to imagine how horrible it would be if one of the bombs [Saddam] made from this [alleged] yellowcake [uranium purchase] exploded in a mushroom cloud and destroyed an American city. But two weeks later [March 7, 2003], the head of the United Nations agency monitoring nuclear weapons proliferation, Nobel Peace Prize […]
3/7/2003
“On 7 March 2003 the [U.K.] Attorney-General [Peter Goldsmith]…makes clear that he has ‘had the opportunity to hear the views of the US administration from their perspective as co-sponsors of the [UN] resolution.’ He tells us that he was impressed by the strength and sincerity of the views of the US administration that Resolution 1441 […]
3/7/2003
On March 7, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix said: ” ‘unlike the US/UK, the inspectors did not believe they had conclusive evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. This strengthened the widely held view that at any rate Iraq did not constitute a threat that had to be dealt with immediately by […]
3/7/2003
“On Friday 7 March [2003] at the [UN] Security Council, [chief UN weapons inspector] Dr [Hans] Blix reported some considerable progress in Iraqi co-operation including the destruction of the ballistic missiles.” – Clare Short, An Honourable Deception?, Page 251 […]
3/7/2003
“On 7 March [2003], [chief UN weapons inspector] Dr [Hans] Blix reported to the [UN] Security Council ‘a substantial measure of disarmament by Iraq with the destruction of large numbers of al-Samoud ballistic missiles.’ It was of this that Dr Blix said to the Security Council: ‘We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal […]
3/7/2003
In a presentation to the United Nations Security Council on March 7, 2003, former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said: “we all know, in 1991 the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] was just days away from determining that Iraq did not have a nuclear program. We soon found out otherwise… The point is that […]
3/7/2003
In a memo written on March 7, 2003, Defense Department official Joseph Collings said Central Command’s Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General John Abidzaid, “appeared to be more concerned than Washington about how the U.S.-led effort [in Iraq] would unfold. ‘We are an antibody in their society,’ Abizaid said in the closed-door meeting [of a U.S. postwar […]
3/7/2003
“On March 7, 2003, Mohamed El Baradei, the director general of the UN’s nuclear inspection and verification arm, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), made a startling statement in remarks to the Security Council: the uranium intelligence was not credible and there was ‘no evidence or plausible indication’ that Iraq had revived a nuclear weapons […]