On March 8, 2003, “The Washington Post put the story on its front page: ‘A key piece of evidence linking Iraq to a nuclear weapons program appears to have been fabricated, the United Nations’ chief nuclear inspector [Hans Blix] said yesterday in a report that called into question U.S. and British claims about Iraq’s secret […]
3/7/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “810. … -Lord Goldsmith’s formal advice of 7 March set out alternative interpretations of the legal effect of resolution 1441. While Lord Goldsmith remained “of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure a second resolution”, he concluded (paragraph 28) that […]
3/7/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “207. Dr ElBaradei reported that there were no indications that Iraq had resumed nuclear activities since the inspectors left in December 1998 and the recently increased level of Iraqi co-operation should allow the IAEA to provide Security Council with an assessment of Iraq’s nuclear […]
3/7/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “805. … -Dr Blix reported to the [UK] Security Council on 7 March that there had been an acceleration of initiatives from Iraq and, while they did not constitute immediate co-operation, they were welcome. UNMOVIC [United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission] would be […]
3/7/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “805. … -On 7 March, Dr ElBaradei reported that there was no indication that Iraq had resumed nuclear activities and that it should be able to provide the [UN] Security Council with an assessment of Iraq’s activities in the near future.” – Commissioned by […]
3/7/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “805. … -By the time the [UK] Security Council met on 7 March 2003 there were deep divisions within it on the way ahead on Iraq.” – Commissioned by the Prime Minister The Right Honourable Gordon Brown MP, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: […]
3/7/2003
In The Iraq War Reader Editors’ Postscript for a chapter by Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein: “On March 7 [2003], [Dr. Mohamed] ElBaradei went further, stating that although his investigations were continuing, his nuclear experts had found ‘no indication’ that Iraq had tried to import hish-strength aluminum tubes or specialized ring magnets for enrichment of […]
3/7/2003
In a report to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei said: “the IAEA had found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq. He presented two stark pieces of information on matters that had recently emerged: […]
3/7/2003
In a report to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix said: ” ‘…after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January. This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly […]
3/7/2003
On March 7, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans “Blix asked for more time to finish his job [in Iraq], estimating that the remaining inspections ‘will not take years, nor weeks, but months.’ ” – Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold, Page 70 […]