As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “237. In an interview on 10 March, President Chirac stated that it was for the inspectors to advise whether they could complete their task. If they reported that they were not in a position to guarantee Iraq’s disarment, it would be: ‘… for the […]
3/10/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “235. In a press conference on 10 March, Mr [Kofi] Annan reiterated the Security Council’s determination to disarm Iraq, but said that every avenue for a peaceful resolution of the crisis had to be exhausted before force should be used. 236. Mr Annan also warned that, […]
3/10/2003
According to a declassified CIA analytic report on March 10, 2003: “[Redacted] Iraqi contacts with al-Qa’ida [redacted] included senior Iraqi officials, suggesting movement toward cooperation at some level. [Redacted] these contacts culminated [redacted] in Iraq’s reported provision of explosives training to al-Qa’ida.” – CIA, “Al-Qa’ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths,” […]
3/10/2003
According to a declassified CIA analytic report on March 10, 2003, Sudan’s National Islamic Front leader Hassan al-“Turabi had agreed to influence fundamentalist groups in Sudan on Iraq’s behalf. [Redacted] most likely at Turabi’s urging, Bin Ladin developed an ‘understanding’ with Saddam that al-Qa’ida would not support any anti-Saddam activities. [Redacted] Bin Ladin continued to […]
3/10/2003
According to a declassified CIA analytic report on March 10, 2003: “[Redacted] Iraq sought Sudanese help to establish contacts with Islamic extremist groups, including al-Qa’ida [redacted] While Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and Bin Ladin differ ideologically, we judge that the Iraq-al-Qa’ida relationship in Sudan showed that both wanted to monitor the other as well as […]
3/10/2003
According to a declassified CIA analytic report on March 10, 2003: “[Redacted] al-Qa’ida had established cooperative relationships by 1996 with at least 20 Sunni Islamic extremist groups in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and East Asia, as well as with elements of the Saudi opposition. This cooperation entailed generating funding, smuggling routes, training, and, […]
3/10/2003
According to a declassified CIA analytic report on March 10, 2003: “Al-Qa’ida procurement officer Abu Hajir al-Iraqi had good ties–not further specified–to Iraqi intelligence, according to Wali Khan, an al-Qa’ida associate convicted in 1996 for his participation in the Manila Air conspiracy.” – CIA, “Al-Qa’ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths,” […]
3/10/2003
According to a declassified CIA analytic report on March 10, 2003: “Intelligence reporting on contacts between Iraq and al-Qa’ida [redacted] included senior Iraqi officials and suggests the contacts culminated [redacted] in Iraq’s provision of explosives training to al-Qa’ida.” – CIA, “Al-Qa’ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths,” (CIA Analytic Report), The […]
3/10/2003
On March 10, 2003, French President Jaques Chirac said, regarding the war in Iraq: ” ‘We should have tried to resolve this crisis without military action if we could, but the grave accusation that I am making is that there was deceit on the way to military action. If we can be deceived about that, […]
3/9/2003
Columnist Maureen Dowd wrote, regarding the upcoming invasion of Iraq: ” ‘It still confuses many Americans that, in a world full of vicious slimeballs, we’re about to bomb one that didn’t attack us on 9/11 (like Osama); that isn’t intercepting our planes (like North Korea); that isn’t financing Al Qaeda (like Saudi Arabia); that isn’t […]