On March 14, 2003, “[Counterterrorism Adviser Rand] Beers quietly tendered his resignation, something almost unheard-of for a senior member of the National Security Council staff in a time of war. Beers recalls his thinking at the time: ‘We were taking our eye off bin Laden and we were going to pay for it, both with respect to […]
3/14/2003
“On March 14 [2003], Senator Jay Rockefeller IV [D-WV], the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, wrote a letter to FBI chief Robert Mueller asking for an investigation because ‘the fabrication of these [Niger yellowcake] documents may be part of a larger deception campaign aimed at manipulating public opinion and foreign policy regarding Iraq.’ […]
3/14/2003
“On April 1, 2008, nearly four years after The Washington Post first revealed the existence of the Torture Memo, the Pentagon released a March [14] 2003 memo that went further than the original 2002 memo in arguing that the wartime powers of the executive as commander in chief of the armed forces are not subject […]
3/14/2003
Deputy Chief of the Office of Legal Counsel John “Yoo’s March [14] 2003 opinion…declared that federal laws prohibiting assault, maiming, and other crimes did not apply to the military interrogators in Guantanamo. …Among the practices the memo discussed as arguably legal were gouging a prisoner’s eyes out, dousing him with ‘scalding water, corrosive acid, or […]
3/13/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “262. On 13 March, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed withdrawing the resolution on 17 March followed by a US ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave within 48 hours. There would be no US military action until after the vote in the House of […]
3/13/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “264. Reporting developments in New York on 13 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock warned that the UK tests had attracted no support, and the US might be ready to call a halt to the UN process on 15 March. The main objections had included the […]
3/13/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “471. Lord Goldsmith concluded on 13 March that, on balance, the ‘better view’ was that the conditions for the operation of the revival argument were met in this case, meaning that there was a lawful basis for the use of force without a further […]
3/12/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “250. In a telephone call with President Bush on 12 March, Mr Blair proposed that the US and UK should continue to seek a compromise in the UN, while confirming that he knew it would not happen. He would say publicly that the French […]
3/12/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “252. When he discussed the options with Mr Straw early on 12 March, Mr Blair decided that the UK would continue to support the US. 253. During Prime Minister’s Questions on 12 March, Mr Blair stated: ‘I hope that even now those countries that […]
3/12/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “252. When he discussed the options with Mr Straw early on 12 March, Mr Blair decided that the UK would continue to support the US. 253. During Prime Minister’s Questions on 12 March, Mr Blair stated: ‘I hope that even now those countries that […]