“The Taliban was virtually created by the I.S.I. [Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence], which wanted to insure that a friendly government took over in Afghanistan after the Soviet war. ‘If you think about how Pakistan views Afghanistan, then it’s no surprise that it supported the Taliban,’ Roger Cressey, a former director for Trans-National Threats on the National […]
8/4/2003
“Globally, a third of the Al Qaeda leadership is thought to have been captured or killed.” – Jane Mayer, “The Search for Osama,” The New Yorker, Aug. 4, 2003 […]
7/31/2003
“After closed-door briefings to select Senate committees four days later [July 31, 2003], [chief CIA weapons inspector David] Kay publicly cautioned that the hunt for WMD was ‘going to take time’ but that his team was making ‘solid progress’ and that every day he was ‘surprised by new advances.’ To the critics on Capitol Hill […]
7/30/2003
According to a Reuters article on July 30, 2003: “When Afghan leaders ruefully suggested that the war in Iraq might have diverted U.S. resources away from Afghanistan, Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seemed to be one remove away from reality in his answer: ‘I don’t think the war in Iraq […]
7/29/2003
From the Top Secret May 7, 2004, CIA Inspector General’s report titled, ‘Counterterrorism, Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-October 2003):‘ “On 29 July 2003, the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet] and the General Counsel [John Rizzo] provided a detailed briefing to selected NSC [National Security Council] Principals on CIA’s detention and interrogation efforts […]
7/29/2003
On July 29, 2003, “David Kay [formerly] of the Iraq Survey Group briefed the president [Bush], [Vice President Dick] Cheney, [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld, [CIA Director George] Tenet, [National Security Advisor Condoleezza] Rice, [Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul] Wolfowitz, and other top aides on the fact that his group had found no evidence of […]
7/29/2003
On July 29, 2003, CIA chief weapons inspector in Iraq David Kay briefed President Bush and his cabinet on his findings. “Kay tried to be gentle…But he couldn’t avoid the bottom line: He had found nothing. …But the president seemed disengaged. ‘I’m not sure that I’ve spoken to anyone at that level who seemed less […]
7/28/2003
“On July 28, 2003, [Central Command leader] GEN [John] Abizaid sent a memorandum to [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld entitled ‘Understanding the War in Iraq,’ in which he outlined who the enemy was, how the enemy was operating, and our recommendations for tackling the problem. Essentially, he listed three solutions: (1) accelerate involvement of Iraqis […]
7/27/2003
Commander of the ground forces in Iraq “General Ricardo Sanchez said in a July [27] 2003 interview with CNN that foreign fighters were entering Iraq ‘from various places. This is what I would call a terrorist magnet, where America, being present here in Iraq, creates a target of opportunity, if you will. But this is […]
7/27/2003
“David Kay, the chief [CIA weapons] inspector [in Iraq], came to the White House and met with the President [Bush] on July 27 [2003]. Kay told the President that it was likely that Saddam had a latent [WMD] capability that he could have mobilized when the pressure from the international community lessened. There was still […]