“[T]he head of the Iraq Survey Group, David Kay, claimed in a statement about his interim report of October 2, 2003, that the group had discovered ‘dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq had concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002.’ … Laboratories, chemicals […]
10/2/2003
“In October [2] 2003, [chief weapons inspector David] Kay’s Iraq Survey Group reported on their preliminary findings. Their report confirmed that Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs ‘spanned more than two decades, involved thousands of people, billions of dollars.’ These programs ‘were elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of Operation […]
10/2/2003
Iraq Survey Group leader David “Kay stated [in his October 2, 2003 report] that his team had found disturbing evidence of compartmentalized biological warfare programs in secret laboratories, whose personnel might have fled abroad, ‘and may have taken evidence and even weapons-related materials with them.’ While the team had not found the materials yet, ‘we […]
10/2/2003
“On October 2 [2003], [Iraq Survey Group leader David] Kay had delivered his initial report to a joint House and Senate committee. His bottom line was clear: at the war’s outbreak, Saddam Hussein had almost certainly not possessed the thousands of tons of poison gas and their delivery warheads, the hundreds of kilos of deadly […]
10/2/2003
According to Iraq Survey Group supervisor David Kay’s preliminary finding, reported to Congress on October 2, 2003: ” ‘We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and […]
10/2/2003
In his report to Congress on October 2, 2003, Iraq Survey Group supervisor David “Kay stressed that Saddam had preserved the technical cadres for WMD work: ‘According to documents and testimony of Iraqi scientists, some of the key technical groups from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program remained largely intact, performing work on nuclear-relevant dual-use technologies […]
10/2/2003
“On October 2, 2003, [Iraq Survey Group supervisor David] Kay reported preliminary findings to Congress. Much of his six-thousand-word report supported the Bush Administration’s prewar assertions: Saddam Hussein’s WMD history, intentions, capabilities, and programs supported the conclusion that Iraq posed serious threats. These findings were overshadowed, however, by what the Iraq Survey Group did not […]
10/2/2003
On October 2, 2003, Iraq Survey Group leader David Kay provided “closed-door briefings to the House and Senate intelligence committees on his interim findings. ‘We have not yet found stocks of weapons,’ Kay said in a statement released by the CIA. His summary was devastating…on every prewar claim–a revived nuclear program, WMD-carrying unmanned drones, stockpiles […]
9/30/2003
“In a September 30, 2003, letter to U.S. Office of Management and Budget Director Joshua Bolton, Congressman Henry Waxman [D] of California explained that members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) estimated that the costs to American taxpayers of many reconstruction projects could be reduced by 90 percent if the projects were awarded to local […]
9/30/2003
In Iraq, “Through the end of September [2003], [CIA chief weapons Inspector David] Kay’s group made lots of ambiguous discoveries–‘dual-use’ production facilities or chemicals that could be used for either weapons or non-WMD products. Chlorine could be used to make chemical weapons, or it could be used to purify water for swimming pools. Kay never […]