Jack Goldsmith replaced Jay Bybee as Chief of the Office of Legal Counsel on October 6, 2003, and he was expected to give legal guidance immediately. “Senior officials had to know right away if it was legal to move Iraqi terror suspects outside the country for interrogation. …Goldsmith didn’t know that in Iraq the CIA […]
10/5/2003
In regards to former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger’s theft of classified documents from the National Archives: “The archives felt it had no choice but to notify the White House about what happened. On Sunday [October 5, 2003], the archives called the White House and asked to speak to someone at NSC [National Security Council]. […]
10/4/2003
“As the insurgency [in Iraq] strengthened, he [President Bush] asserted [on October 4, 2003] that by taking on the Iraqi resistance, ‘Americans would not have to confront terrorists in the streets of our own cities.’ ” – Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack, Page 236 […]
10/4/2003
9/11 Family Steering Committee members Mindy Kleinberg and Lorie van Auken were concerned about 9/11 Commission Staff Director Phillip Zelikow’s close ties to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. ” ‘If he’s looking at the NSC [National Security Council], that means he’s investigating himself,’ said Lorie van Auken at the time [in a United Press International […]
10/3/2003
The Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005, quoted from the Iraq Survey Group’s (ISG) Interim Report, which was released on October 3, 2003. ” ‘With respect to mobile BW [biological weapons] production facilities, the *ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed or was developing production systems on road vehicles or railway […]
10/3/2003
The Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005, quoted from the Iraq Survey Group’s (ISG) Interim Report, which was released on October 3, 2003. ” ‘…the ISG *found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW [biological weapons] program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes.’ […]
10/3/2003
The Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005, quoted from the Iraq Survey Group’s (ISG) Interim Report, which was released on October 3, 2003. ” ‘The ISG concluded that *Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW [biological] weapons and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent* shortly after […]
10/3/2003
Following CIA chief weapons inspector David Kay’s testimony to Congress regarding weapons of mass destruction on October 2, 2003, President “Bush tried to spin things himself the next day [October 3, 2003], saying that Kay’s report ‘states Saddam Hussein’s regime had a clandestine network of biological laboratories, a live strain of deadly agent botulinum, sophisticated […]
10/2/2003
“David Kay, who led the Iraq Survey Group’s effort to locate weapons of mass destruction, noted in his report of October [2] 2003 ‘the almost unbelievable scale of Iraq’s conventional weapons armory. …For example, there are approximately 130 known Iraqi Ammunition Storage Points (ASP), many of which exceed 50 square miles in size and hold […]
10/2/2003
” ‘Iraq’s WMD programs spanned more than two decades, involved thousands of people, billions of dollars, and were elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom,’ he [Iraq Survey Group leader David Kay] told Congress in October [2] 2003.” – George W. Bush, Decision Points, Page […]