” ‘It [the Bush Administration’s case for the Iraq invasion] was not bad intelligence. It was much more. It was an orchestrated effort. It began before the war, was a major effort during the war, and continues as post-conflict distortions,’ wrote [retired Air Force Colonel and military analyst Sam] Gardiner in a fifty-six-page self-published report […]
10/8/2003
On October 8, 2003, at the 2003 Republican National Committee Presidential Gala in Washington, D.C., President George W. Bush said: “Yet it is now undeniable–undeniable–that Saddam Hussein was in clear violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 [which offered him a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations]. It is undeniable that Saddam Hussein […]
10/7/2003
“Even if it were eventually determined that there were no weapons [of mass destruction in Iraq], [Secretary of State Colin] Powell said [in an October 7, 2003, column in The Washington Post], the ‘harrowing possibility’ that they might have existed–and that they ‘could’ have found their way into the hands of international terrorists–was ample justification […]
10/7/2003
” ‘Although [Iraq Survey Group leader David] Kay and his team have not yet discovered stocks of the weapons themselves,’ [Secretary of State Colin] Powell wrote in an October 7 [2003] column in The Washington Post, there was ample evidence that Saddam had deceived the United Nations. The team had found ‘strains of organisms’ in […]
10/6/2003
“[I]nspectors from the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia had been searching the country for evidence to prove Saddam had WMDs. They were part of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which replaced the UN inspection teams. The ISG’s first report in October [6] 2003 stated that no weapons had been found.” – Andrew Langley, Bush, […]
10/6/2003
The creation of the Iraq Stabilization Group, “according to several [Bush] administration officials, grew out of Mr. Bush’s frustration at the setbacks in Iraq and the absence of more visible progress in Afghanistan, at a moment when remnants of the Taliban appear to be newly active. It is the closest the White House has come […]
10/6/2003
“The White House has ordered a major reorganization of American efforts to quell violence in Iraq and Afghanistan and to speed the reconstruction of both countries, according to senior administration officials. The new effort includes the creation of an ‘Iraq Stabilization Group,’ which will be run by the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice. The decision […]
10/6/2003
In order to ‘take charge of key policy decisions’ in Iraq, “The White House announced the formation of the Iraq Stabilization Group on October 6 [2003]. In a background briefing to reporters, [National Security Advisor Condoleezza] Rice downplayed suggestions that she was reining in [Director of the Coalition Provisional Authority L. Paul] Bremer or cutting […]
10/6/2003
“In an interview on the BBC program HARDtalk on October 6, 2003, he [former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter] told [newsman] David Jessel that the United Nations had accounted for between 90 and 95 percent of Iraq’s WMD capability during its work.” – Deepak Tripathi, Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan, Page 62 […]
10/6/2003
In October 2003, President “Bush agreed to set up a new task force, the Iraq Stabilization Group, which was to coordinate Iraq policy from the White House and be run by [National Security Advisor Condoleezza] Rice. Early in October, she sent a memo describing the new group to [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld, [Secretary of […]