On October 31, 2003, “The National Intelligence Council (NIC) distributes a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluding that the insurgency is homegrown and thrives on Iraqi resentment of the U.S. occupation, and warning that the unrest could lead to civil war. The analysis, produced at the request of U.S. Central Command, is dismissed by the White […]
10/30/2003
In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on October 30, 2003, Deputy Chief in the Office of Legal Counsel John Yoo said: ” ‘It appears clear that the Fourth Amendment’s [prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures] warrant requirement does not apply to surveillance and searches undertaken to protect the national security from external threats.’ […]
10/29/2003
“The formal Supplemental request [for funds for the reconstruction of Iraq] was fifty-three pages long and totaled $20.3 billion. …In September 2003, [Director of the Coalition Provisional Authority L. Paul] Bremer traveled to Washington to testify before four Congressional committees considering the Supplemental. He compared the aid package with the Marshall Plan. …Five weeks later […]
10/29/2003
General James R. Clapper, Jr., director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, told The New York Times on October 29, 2003: ” ‘I think people below the Saddam Hussein-and-his-sons level saw what was coming and decided the best thing to do was to destroy and disperse [his illicit weapons material].’ Clapper said satellite imagery […]
10/28/2003
When questioned by a member of the press regarding a speech he gave on May 1, 2003, declaring major combat operation over, yet there had been 217 KIAs, and over a 1,000 wounded since then, President George W. Bush had this to say: "Nora, I think you ought to look at my speech. I said, Iraq is […]
10/28/2003
According to an October 28, 2003, Financial Times article: “In congressional testimony [on October 24, 2003], former CIA Counterterrorism chief Vince Cannistraro said that in the weeks and months leading up to the war in Iraq, the White House had exerted unprecedented pressure on the CIA and other intelligence agencies to come up with evidence […]
10/27/2003
“The [top secret] memo [written by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith to the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, on October 27, 2003] was said to demonstrate that al Qaeda and Iraq had a close, substantive relationship that involved ‘training in explosives and weapons of mass destruction, logistical support for […]
10/27/2003
In Iraq, on October 27, 2003, “the official beginning of Ramadan, a suicide bomber rammed an ambulance filled with explosives into the Red Cross compound near the Green Zone [in Baghdad]. And in coordinated attacks, four recently opened Baghdad police stations were attacked in a similar manner. With thirty-five killed and 244 wounded, October 27, […]
10/27/2003
Secretary of Defense Donald “Rumsfeld’s office gave [Director of the Coalition Provisional Authority L. Paul] Bremer a memo drafted by [Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul] Wolfowitz and [Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas] Feith that proposed a new plan: sovereignty would be handed over to an expanded version of the Governing Council by the following […]
10/27/2003
In a New Yorker article on October 27, 2003, Seymour “Hersh explains how ventures like the Office of Special Plans created a ‘stovepipe’ through which raw intelligence from the field could bypass ‘customary procedures for vetting intelligence’ and reach the highest levels of the executive branch without being ‘subjected to rigorous scrutiny.’ ” – Eugene […]