Former Iraq Survey Group leader David Kay presented his findings to President Bush’s cabinet on January 29, 2004. “Discussing Kay’s findings, Bush showed no anger. ‘The president accepted it,’ Kay recalled. ‘There was no sign of disappointment from Bush. He was at peace with his decision to go to war. I don’t think he ever […]
1/28/2004
In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2004, Iraq Survey Group leader “David Kay said, ‘It was reasonable to conclude that Iraq posed an imminent threat… What we learned during the [weapons] inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place potentially than in fact we thought it was even before the war.’ […]
1/28/2004
Former chief weapons inspector in Iraq, David Kay, testified on the search for WMD before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2004. ” ‘I think the world is far safer with the disappearance and removal of Saddam Hussein,’ Kay said. ‘I think that when we have the complete record, you’re going to discover […]
1/28/2004
Former chief weapons inspector in Iraq, David Kay, testified on the search for WMD before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2004. ” ‘Let me begin by saying, we were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself there. …My view was that the best evidence that I has seen was that Iraq […]
1/28/2004
On January 28, 2004, former Iraq Survey Group leader David Kay “told the Senate Armed Services Committee that ‘it turns out we were all wrong’ about Iraq’s weapons. His team had combed the country and found no signs of stockpiles, ‘large or small.’ Kay said he believed the uncovered mobile laboratories, which the CIA still […]
1/28/2004
After resigning as chief weapons inspector for Iraq, David “Kay testified publicly before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28 [2004]. …’We were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself.’ Kay said 85 percent of the work was done and he had no reason to believe they ever would find WMD stockpiles in […]
1/28/2004
“Testifying before the Senate armed services committee on January 28 [2004]…[former Iraq Survey Group leader David] Kay told the panel ‘We were almost all wrong–and I certainly included myself here.’ The WMDs weren’t hidden; they hadn’t been produced in the first place. …Kay said an independent commission was needed to investigate the Iraq intelligence failure.” […]
1/28/2004
” ‘We now know,’ said Senator [Bill] Nelson [D-FL] in January [28] 2004, ‘after the fact and on the basis of [former Iraq Survey Group leader] Dr. [David] Kay’s testimony today in the Senate Armed Services Committee, that the information [regarding WMDs in Iraq] was false; and not only that there were not weapons of […]
1/27/2004
In the Oval Office on January 27, 2004, reporters “asked [President] Bush whether he had any doubts about the prewar intelligence. The Iraq Survey Group would continue its search, he replied vaguely, and it was important to ‘find out the facts and compare the facts to what was thought.’ Pressed to respond to Democrats’ calls […]
1/27/2004
“…FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] intelligence was never provided with, or even informed about, the State Department’s list of known or suspected terrorists. Thus, there was a tremendous disparity between the FAA’s ‘no-fly’ list, which on 9/11 comprised twelve names, including [9/11 mastermind] Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, and the State Department’s TIPOFF list, which included some 60,000 […]