According to a Reuters article on July 13, 2004: “John McLaughlin, who had stepped in as acting head of the CIA after George Tenet’s departure, told a congressional panel that the terror threat leading up to the November [2004] elections was ‘as serious a threat environment as I have seen since 9/11.’ ” – Peter […]
7/13/2004
Former Ambassador and Senior Member of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (OHRA) Robin Raphel spoke about the OHRA’s role in Iraq in an interview with Charles Kennedy on July 13, 2004. ” ‘It was supposed to be a [Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed] Chalabi-centered effort with the five other [Iraqi political faction] parties… […]
7/10/2004
According to a New York Times article on July 10, 2004: “Senator Jay Rockefeller [D-WV], the ranking Democrat on the Intelligence Committee, flatly stated that if he had known then what he knows now, he would not have voted for the war resolution that sent so many U.S. troops into harms way [in Iraq] [sic].” […]
7/9/2004
“On July 9, 2004, the FBI’s Office of Inspections distributed an e-mail asking its agents who were stationed at Guantanamo whether they had witnessed, ‘Aggressive treatment, interrogations or interview techniques…which were not consistent with FBI interview policy/guidelines.’ More than two-dozen agents responded that they observed numerous instances of detainee abuse. One FBI agent wrote that, […]
7/9/2004
“As the CIA noted at the time [in the July 9, 2004, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq], ‘[I]t would be difficult for al-Qaida to maintain an active, long-term presence in Iraq without alerting the authorities or obtaining their acquiescence.’ ” – Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, Page 446 […]
7/9/2004
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSIC) Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, dated July 7, 2004, “noted that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) ‘focused its terrorist activities on western interests, particularly against the U.S. and Israel.’ According to the SSIC report: ‘The CIA summarized nearly 50 intelligence reports as […]
7/9/2004
“On July 9, 2004, the Senate Intelligence Committee issued a blistering 511-page report that proved, definitively, that the information Congress had relied on in support of the invasion of Iraq, was ‘either overstated or…not supported by the underlying intelligence’ when it came to allegations that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. Delivering 117 separate […]
7/9/2004
“On July 9 [2004], the Senate Intelligence Committee said in a scathing, 511-page document that the CIA and other American intelligence agencies had produced false and misleading information before the Iraq War about Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs. The committee laid the blame on what it characterized as a sloppy, dysfunctional intelligence structure led by [CIA […]
7/9/2004
According to a July 10, 2004, article in The New York Times, on July 9, “the Intelligence Committee would issue a scathing report condemning the major findings in the [October 1, 2002 National Intelligence] assessment as unsubstantiated by the CIA’s own reporting and [CIA Director George] Tenet himself would term it ‘flawed analysis.’ But at […]
7/9/2004
“The initial report by the Senate Intelligence Committee, published in July [9] 2004, severely criticized the CIA for overestimating the danger posed by Saddam’s WMD programs. It also concluded that there had been no significant ties between Saddam and Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terrorist network.” – Con Coughlin, Saddam: His Rise and Fall, Page 374 […]