According to a Los Angeles Times article on April 10, 2005: “USAID’s [United States Agency for International Development’s] director for the water sector, Mark Oviatt, said, ‘This has been my biggest problem and concern in Iraq. Americans are investing hundreds of millions in Iraq. The capacity is not there to maintain it.’ ” – Ali […]
4/10/2005
“A report in the Los Angeles Times on 10 April, 2005 on the reconstruction efforts described how ‘Iraqi officials have crippled scores of water, sewage and electrical plants refurbished with U.S. funds by failing to maintain and operate them properly, wasting millions of American taxpayer dollars in the process.’ ” – Ali A. Allawi, The […]
4/6/2005
“On April 6, 2005, the National Assembly chose Jalal Talabani as President [of Iraq]. On the following day, Talabani designated Ibrahim al-Jaafari to form his cabinet.” – Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq, Page 396 […]
4/2/2005
President George W. Bush: “This week, I also directed Homeland Security Advisor Fran Townsend to oversee the interagency review of the commission’s findings and ensure that concrete action is taken. The commission’s report delivers a sharp critique of the way intelligence has been collected and analyzed against some of the most difficult intelligence targets, like […]
4/1/2005
“Overall, [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld presented a picture of a defense chief who didn’t bother to read half the memos that crossed his desk and generally handed off responsibility to others: [From Rumsfeld’s interview with the Department of Defense’s Deputy Inspector General for Investigations, on April 1, 2005] ‘Day in and out I rely […]
3/31/2005
The Robb-Silberman Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction concluded on March 31, 2005, that “Signals Intelligence provided only minimal information regarding Iraq’s chemical weapons programs and, due to the nature of the sources, what was provided was of dubious quality and therefore of questionable value.’ ” – […]
3/31/2005
The Robb-Silberman Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction’s Report to the President of the United States on March 31, 2005 “concluded that there was ‘virtually no useful signals intelligence [in Iraq] on a target that was one of the United States’ top intelligence priorities.’ ” – Matthew […]
3/31/2005
The conclusion of the Robb-Silberman Commission report on March 31, 2005, included the following ‘Biological Warfare Findings:’ ” ‘1. The DIA’s [Defense Intelligence Agency’s] Defense HUMINT [human intelligence] Service’s failure even to attempt to validate [Iraqi informant] Curveball’s reporting was a major failure in operational tradecraft. 2. Indications of possible problems with Curveball began to […]
3/31/2005
The report of the presidential commission chaired by Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, released March 31, 2005, said, in its conclusion: ” ‘In retrospect, we conclude that the Intelligence Community’s leadership should have more aggressively investigated [Iraqi informant] Curveball’s bona fides, rather than seeing the confidence of the analysts and the responsible liaison […]
3/31/2005
According to the Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005: ” ‘…CIA’s post-war investigations revealed that INC [Iraqi National Congress]-related sources had a minimal impact on pre-war assessments. The October [1] 2002 NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] relied on reporting from two INC sources, both of whom were later deemed to be fabricators. […]