2/15/1996

Mansoor Ijaz, former mediator between Sudan and the U.S., revealed: “In order to relax the economic sanctions weighing on Sudan, President Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir offered to extradite Osama bin Laden to Saudi Arabia or seize bin Laden’s economic network in Sudan. In February 1996, several Sudanese officials visited the United States to press their […]

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2/7/1996

“Citing security concerns, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher had ordered all American personnel to leave the embassy in Khartoum [Sudan] in February [7] 1996. Later, the CIA would have to ‘withdraw’ more than one hundred of its reports on Sudan when its main source–a rebel sympathizer earning $100 per report–failed a routine polygraph test. […]

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2/6/1996

U.S. ambassador to Sudan Timothy Carney met with Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha on February 6, 1996, to discuss Sudan’s support for terrorists. “Osama bin Laden was one of Sudan’s biggest sources of grief in Washington, Carney said. Sudan should expel him and provide information to the United States about his finances and his […]

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1/22/1996

According to The New York Times on January 22, 1996, following the sentencing of militant Islamist Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman on January 17, 1996,  “in Cairo [Egypt], the Islamic Group [aka Gamma’a al’Islamiya] issued a pledge: ‘The Gamma’a al’Islamiya vow[s] to God that it will respond blow for blow. American interests and people will be […]

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1/17/1996

“On January 17, 1996, the presiding judge [at the ‘Day of Terror’ trial in New York] handed out life sentences to the ten defendants who hadn’t entered into plea agreements with the government. El-Sayyid Nosair was finally convicted in the murder of Meir Kahane, as well as other charges, and sentenced to life in prison. […]

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1/17/1996

On January 17, 1996, “Sheikh [Omar Abdel] Rahman is sentenced to life in prison for his role in the Day of Terror plot. But in a precursor of things to come, Egyptian U.S. postal worker Ahmed Abdel Sattar vows that ‘the man will never be silenced,’ and the al Gamma’a Islamiya (IG)–the Egyptian terrorist group […]

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1/15/1996

“Before January [1996] was over, the CIA had created ‘Alec Station,’ the first ‘virtual’ office that focused on a specific individual (as opposed to a country). Formally known as ‘the bin Laden issue station,’ it was initially staffed by sixteen analysts and located in an office park a few miles from the headquarters at Langley […]

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1/15/1996

A January 1996 Council of Foreign Relations report, “Making Intelligence Smarter,” said: ” ‘The U.S. intelligence community faces major challenges, including a widespread lack of confidence in its ability to carry out its mission completely and legally. …The intelligence community has been adjusting to the changed demands of the post-Cold War world for several years…[but] additional […]

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1/15/1996

“At the same time [January 1996], the two bin Laden ‘offices of origin’ in New York, the SDNY [Southern District of New York] and the FBI’s NYO [New York Office], dedicated an existing unit, Squad I-49, to building a case against the Saudi billionaire.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] […]

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1/15/1996

“As the threats from bin Laden began to grow, the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center in January 1996 established a separate unit with the sole mission of collecting intelligence on the Al Qaeda leader [Osama bin Laden] and disrupting his network. In an unprecedented action, the unit became a separate CIA ‘station’ [known as ‘Alec Station’]–the only […]

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