10/15/2000

“The armed Predator [drone] flew over Afghanistan eleven times in September and October 2000, [counterterrorism czar Richard] Clarke told the author [Richard Miniter]. It supplied hours of clear video, showing bin Laden in various compounds. In October 2000, the Predator crashed in Afghanistan. Whether it was brought down by high winds or machine gunfire, no […]

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10/15/2000

“In October 2000, the president [Bill Clinton] chose not to identify bin Laden as the originator of the attack on the USS Cole, even though his own intelligence apparatus said there was no other conclusion.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story, Page […]

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10/15/2000

“Beginning in October 2000, as a result of extremely sloppy and questionable work by the FBI, the FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] court ordered the wall between the FBI’s criminal investigators and the NSA’s [National Security Agency’s] eavesdroppers heightened considerably. The court found errors in approximately one hundred applications for FISA warrants, mostly in affidavits […]

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10/15/2000

The Military Policy staff of the 9/11 Commission concluded on March 23, 2004, that actionable intelligence was lacking in order for President Bill Clinton to respond militarily to the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000: “The problem was in assigning responsibility for the attack. The intelligence community immediately suspected al Qaeda, but they […]

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10/13/2000

“A Pentagon intelligence analyst [Kie Fallis] resigned on October 13 [2000], declaring that his warnings about al Qaeda in the region had been ignored and suppressed by his superiors. None of his analysis involved specific threats against the [USS] Cole, however. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, the former White House counterterrorism aides in [counterterrorism czar] […]

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10/12/2000

“There had been no specific tactical warning that the [USS] Cole was a target [when it was attacked on October 12, 2000]. The CIA had circulated a classified analysis the day before the attack that highlighted the growing al Qaeda threat in the region, but it provided no specific warning about the Cole.”  – Steve […]

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10/12/2000

“At 10:45 A.M. on the morning of October 12 [2000], two al Qaeda suicide bombers loaded a device made of C-4 explosive into a small skiff and took off across the harbor in Aden, Yemen. The U.S.S. Cole, an advanced guided missile destroyer, was at the refueling dock… when the white fiberglass boat pulled alongside, […]

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10/12/2000

“On October 12, 2000, al Qaeda operatives on a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole, killing 17 members of the ship’s crew and wounding at least 40. The plot…was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Ladin.”  – 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, Page 190 […]

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10/12/2000

“Even after the [USS] Cole bombing [on October 12, 2000], [Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard] Clarke could not persuade Defense Secretary William Cohen or his top uniformed officer, Hugh Shelton, to take an offensive strike against al Qaeda or the Taliban seriously. ‘Although we fully shared Mr. Clarke’s anger and frustration,’ recalled [then-Secretary of State] Madeleine Albright […]

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10/12/2000

“On the morning of October 12 [2000], two al Qaeda suicide bombers load a device made of C-4 explosive into a small skiff and take off across the harbor in Aden, Yemen. The U.S.S. Cole, an advanced guided missile destroyer, is at the refueling dock. As the skiff approaches the ship…the bomb detonates, blowing a […]

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