8/15/2001

“In August [2001], aware of the need for vigilance, the C.I.A. issued another report reminding senior policy makers at the White House, Pentagon and State Department that Al Qaeda was still committed to attacking American interests.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – James Risen, “In Hindsight, C.I.A. Sees Flaws […]

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8/15/2001

From the 9/11 Commission Report’s list of Operational Opportunities: “August 2001: FBI headquarters does not recognize the significance of the information regarding [suspected terrorist Zacarias] Moussaoui’s training and beliefs and thus does not take adequate action to share information, involve higher-level officials across agencies, obtain information regarding Moussaoui’s ties to al Qaeda, and give sufficient […]

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8/15/2001

Pointing blame towards the ‘wall’ which prevented the sharing of information between counterintelligence and law enforcement officials, presidential advisor Karl Rove wrote: “two of the terrorists who crashed Flight 77 into the Pentagon on 9/11 [Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar] managed to escape FBI detection the previous month [August 2001] because an agent […]

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8/15/2001

From the 9/11 Commission Report’s list of Operational Opportunities: “August 2001: the CIA does not focus on information that [9/11 mastermind] Khalid Sheikh Mohammed [KSM] is a key al Qaeda lieutenant or connect information identifying KSM as the ‘Mukhtar’ mentioned in other reports to the analysis that could have linked ‘Mukhtar’ with [9/11 conspirator] Ramzi […]

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8/15/2001

“On August 15 [2001], he [head of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, Cofer Black] concluded a briefing to the Department of Defense’s Annual Convention on Counterterrorism with the comment, ‘We are going to be struck soon, many Americans are going to die, and it could be in the U.S.’ “  – James Bamford, The Shadow Factory, […]

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8/15/2001

From the 9/11 Commission Report’s list of Operational Opportunities: “August 2001: the CIA and FBI do not connect the presence of [future 9/11 hijackers Khalid al] Mihdhar, [Nawaf al] Hamzi, and [suspected terrorist Zacarias] Moussaoui to the general threat reporting about imminent attacks.” [The 15th of the month is used for date sorting purposes only.] […]

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8/15/2001

“In August 2001, either NSA [National Security Agency] or Britain’s GCHQ [Government Communications Headquarters] intercepted a telephone call from one of bin Laden’s chief lieutenants, Abu Zubaida, to an al Qaeda operative believed to have been in Pakistan. The intercept centered on an operation that was to take place in September. At about the same […]

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8/15/2001

” ‘You’re basically asking for the overthrow of the Taliban,’ an incredulous midlevel State Department officer told [future Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s brother] Qayum Karzai in one meeting that August [2001]. ‘I’m not sure if our government is prepared to do that.’ “ [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – […]

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8/15/2001

“According to an eyewitness in the al Qaeda camp at the time, an Australian convert to Islam, Osama had told his closest advisers and [Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad] Omar in August 2001 that an attack on America was imminent, but many of his aides objected to the idea as too dangerous. Osama decided to go […]

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8/15/2001

“Three weeks before the [9/11] attack [in August 2001]…a French-Algerian named Habib Zacarias Moussaoui booked hours on a flight simulator at an aviation school in Minneapolis. He wanted to learn, in a hurry, how to fly a jet–landing procedures didn’t matter–and he paid for everything in cash. The flight instructor became suspicious and informed the […]

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