9/13/2001

“President Saddam Hussein said the attacks on the United States were the result of America’s ‘evil policy,’ contending that the United States exports corruption and crime through its military forces and its movies. He suggested the attacks might have been carried out by Americans.”  – “After The Attacks, Reaction From Around The World,” The New […]

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9/13/2001

In a National Security Council meeting with President Bush on September 13, 2001: “Looking beyond bin Laden and Afghanistan, [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld mentioned Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a threat to both its region and to the United States. Iraq, he observed, was a state that supported terrorism, and that might someday offer terrorists […]

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9/13/2001

Recollection of the changes made to the wording of the original AUMF following 9/11. “Almost immediately some of our most seasoned members, including Senator Joe Biden of Delaware and Carl Levin of Michigan, chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, respectively, pointed out the obvious flaws in passing a […]

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9/13/2001

“Mr. bin Laden summoned Arab reporters on Wednesday [September 13, 2001] to a compound in Afghanistan to deny responsibility for the stunning [9/11] strikes while praising those who conducted them. American intelligence officials now dismiss such denials.”  – Judith Miller, “Bin Laden: Child of Privilege who Champions Holy War,” The New York Times, Sep. 14, […]

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9/13/2001

After a meeting with President Bush and his National Security Council on September 13, 2001, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith said: “As I left this meeting, I was struck by several points. Two days after the attacks, I noticed, [CIA director] George Tenet seemed already to have concluded that Usama bin Laden and […]

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9/13/2001

National Security Advisor Condoleezza “Rice chaired a Principals Committee meeting on September 13 [2001]…to refine how the fight against al Qaeda would be conducted. The principals agreed that the overall message should be that anyone supporting al Qaeda would risk harm. The United States would need to integrate diplomacy, financial measures, intelligence, and military actions […]

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9/13/2001

“On September 13 [2001], two days after the attacks, [Saudi Ambassador Prince] Bandar met again with the president [Bush] at the White House. The president told Bandar, ‘If we get somebody and we can’t get them to cooperate, we hand them over to you.’ With those words, the president casually expressed what became the U.S. […]

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9/13/2001

On September 13, 2001, “Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Maleeha Lodhi, and the visiting head of Pakistan’s military intelligence service, Mahmud Ahmed. Armitage said that the United States wanted Pakistan to take seven steps: *to stop al Qaeda operatives at its border and end all […]

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9/13/2001

During lunch on September 13, 2001, a former top British intelligence officer said to CIA Chief of Clandestine Operations in Europe, Tyler Drumheller: ” ‘You need to learn from our history,’ …’We decided to turn the terrorists’ tactics back on them. For a time, it worked. It stopped the immediate attacks. But watch out,’ he […]

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9/13/2001

“Sep 13, 2001: DOT [Department of Transportation] ordered the reopening of the national airspace to U.S. air carriers, effective 11:00 a.m., provided that the airport involved had implemented the new security measures. …Foreign air carriers were still not allowed to fly into the United States, with certain exceptions, but could depart if they met the […]

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