According to the National Intelligence Estimate of October 1, 2002: “The only situation in which Saddam might take the ‘extreme step’ of assisting an Islamic terrorist group like Al Qaeda in attacking the United States would be one in which Saddam had been cornered and felt the United States was on the verge of upending […]
Category: quotes
10/1/2002
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of October 1, 2002 said: “that the United States had a ‘high confidence’ that: ‘*Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs contrary to U.S. resolutions. *We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs. *Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles. […]
10/1/2002
“The National Intelligence Estimate that was provided to Congress in October [1] 2002 reported that Saddam had up to several dozen Scud missiles with ranges of 400 to 550 miles. The threat that Saddam might fire Scuds with WMD warheads at Israel had been one of the Pentagon’s biggest worries and extensive training had been […]
10/1/2002
” ‘I haven’t made up my mind we’re going to war with Iraq,’ he [President Bush] said at an October [1, 2002] press conference. ‘I’ve made up my mind we need to disarm the man [Saddam Hussein]. …There needs to be a strong new [United Nations] resolution in order for us to make it clear […]
10/1/2002
The CIA’s classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, delivered to Congress on October 1, 2002, “offered bold and definitive conclusions in its ‘key judgments’: Iraq, it said, ‘has chemical and biological weapons’ and ‘is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.’ …Deeper in the NIE, there was information that undercut those stark […]
10/1/2002
“The NIE [National Intelligence Estimate, released on October 1, 2002] stated with ‘high confidence’ that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program since the U.N. weapons inspectors had left Iraq in 1998, adding that Iraq ‘probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.’ According to former NSA [National Security Agency] and CIA analysts, NSA […]
10/1/2002
In analyzing the NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) completed on October 1, 2002, then-CIA Director George Tenet said: “An NIE had never been relied upon as a basis for going to war, and, in my view, the decision to invade Iraq was not solely predicated on this one. But if we had done a better job […]
10/1/2002
“The most contentious of the NSA [National Security Agency] SIGINT [signals intelligence] material used in the [October 1, 2002] NIE [National Intelligence Estimate] alleged that the Iraqis were developing unmanned drones for the purpose of delivering chemical or biological weapons to targets in the United States. This claim was largely based on an inferential reading […]
10/1/2002
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is a division of the State Department that has clearance to view intelligence gathered by all other agencies. “At the end of the Key Judgments section of the NIE [National Intelligence Estimate of October 1, 2002], a textbox was included, with the title ‘State/INR Alternative View.’ ‘In INR’s […]
10/1/2002
“On October 1 [2002], Baghdad agreed that [UN weapons] inspectors could return [to Iraq], and the UN weapons team agreed to await further instructions from the Security Council before taking up its chores.” – Todd S. Purdum and The New York Times Staff, A Time of Our Choosing, Pages 59-60 […]