“A joint study [in January 2003] by the Council on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University warned of possible anarchy and the need for the U.S. military to quickly turn to humanitarian efforts and law enforcement [following an invasion of Iraq].” [The 15th of the month […]
Category: quotes
1/15/2003
“A declassified CIA report from January 2003, called ‘Iraqi Support for Terrorism,’ concluded: ‘Iraq continues to be a safe haven, transit point, or operational node for groups and individuals who direct violence against the United States, Israel, and other allies. Iraq has a long history of supporting terrorism. During the last four decades, it has […]
1/15/2003
“In January 2003, NSA [National Security Agency] was tasked by the White House to monitor the communications of a surprisingly large number of international organizations, all of whom were key players standing in the way of the Bush administration’s strenuous efforts to convince the world community to join the U.S. and Britain and its so-called […]
1/15/2003
“By January 2003, a plan for [taking control of] Iraqi oil crafted by the State Department and oil majors emerged under the guidance of Amy Myers Jaffe of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. It recommended maintaining the state-owned Iraq National Oil Company, whose origins dated back to 1961–but […]
1/15/2003
“As of January [2003], NSA [National Security Agency] was also intercepting the communications traffic (calls, e-mails, cables, etc.) of the United Nations’ chief weapons inspector, Dr. Hans Blix, and his deputies. According to Bob Woodward of the Washington Post, President Bush was convinced that the Swedish diplomat was saying one thing in public and quite […]
1/15/2003
On January 15, 2003, General Counsel of the U.S. Navy Alberto “Mora delivered an unsigned draft memo [pushing for reform at Guantanamo] to [legal counsel to Secretary of Defense Jim] Haynes and said that he planned to ‘sign it out’ that afternoon–making it an official document–unless the harsh interrogation techniques were suspended. Mora’s draft memo […]
1/15/2003
The National Intelligence Council’s January 2003 report, titled ‘Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq,’ “predicted that ‘The building of an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult, and probably turbulent process. …[A] post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each other unless […]
1/15/2003
“It was in this WINPAC [Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center] office that [author James] Bamford’s informant worked at the turn of the year 2002-2003. In January [2003] the informant’s boss at WINPAC convened about fifty people in a meeting to bolster the case for WMDs, described by Bamford in A Pretext for War. […]
1/15/2003
“In an informal National Intelligence Estimate [in January 2003], intelligence agencies unanimously conclude that Saddam was unlikely to attack the United States unless attacked first.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.] – Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold, Page 256 […]
1/13/2003
On January 13, 2003, Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar al Sultan met with President Bush. “…the president said that he was receiving advice and reports from some in his administration that in the event of war he [Bush] would have to contend with a massive Arab and Islamic reaction that would put American interests at risk… […]