1/27/2003

On January 27, 2003, “Mohammed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), publicly declared that the IAEA inspectors who had been on the ground in Iraq during the months before the invasion had ‘found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program since the elimination of the program in the […]

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1/27/2003

“At a NSC [National Security Council] meeting on January 27, 2003, [CIA Director] George Tenet was given a hard-copy draft of the State of the Union address [President] Bush was to deliver the next day. That day, Tenet returned to CIA headquarters and, without even reading the speech, gave a copy to an assistant who […]

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1/26/2003

Speaking before the World Economic Forum on January 26, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that though Iraq was given a final opportunity to disarm, “Iraq had ‘failed the test.’ …Powell asked, ‘Where are the mobile vans that are nothing more than biological weapons laboratories on wheels? Why is Iraq still trying to procure […]

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1/26/2003

Following Secretary of State Colin Powell’s January 26, 2003, speech at the World Economic Forum about the need for regime change in Iraq, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans said, of Powell: ” ‘He’s a decent guy, but I don’t think he changed any minds. …We don’t need much evidence, just enough to know that […]

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1/26/2003

“In his Davos [Switzerland] speech [at the World Economic Forum on January 26, 2003] he [Secretary of State Colin Powell] had cited allegations that his own State Department analysts questioned, including the attempts [by Iraq] to import uranium and nuclear-related aluminum tubes as well as the ties between Saddam and al-Qaeda.”  – Karen DeYoung, Soldier: […]

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1/26/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “154. Mr Blair used an interview on Breakfast with Frost on 26 January to set out the position that the inspections should be given sufficient time to determine whether or not Saddam Hussein was co-operating fully. If he was not, that would be sufficient […]

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1/25/2003

In an interview for the PBS program Frontline: The War Behind Closed Doors, on January 25, 2003, Defense Policy Board Adviser Richard “Perle predicted on behalf of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board that should the United States fail to carry through with its Iraq policy, ‘it will open the floodgates to terror against us.’ ” […]

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1/25/2003

In an interview for the PBS program Frontline: The War Behind Closed Doors, on January 25, 2003, Defense Policy Board Adviser Richard “Perle said, ‘There is tremendous potential to transform the [Middle East] region. If a tyrant like Saddam Hussein can be brought down, others are going to begin to think.’ ”  – Stefan Halper […]

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1/25/2003

“By late January [2003] the Bush and Blair administrations had determined that Iraq had failed to fully disarm and as a result they were putting tremendous pressure on the uncommitted members of the [UN] Security Council to vote in favor of its tough go-to-war resolution. …By listening in as the delegates communicated back to their […]

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1/25/2003

“On January 25 [2003], in the White House Situation Room, [vice presidential Chief of Staff Scooter] Libby claimed that intercepts and human intelligence reports indicated that Iraq had been concealing, moving, and burying items…they had to be WMDs. He reported that Saddam’s ties to al-Qaeda were extensive.”  – Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris, Page […]

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