1/27/2003

“…on January 27 [2003], the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] reported to the UN Security Council that it had found no evidence of an active nuclear weapons program in Iraq. The aluminum tubes, the agency reported, appeared to be ‘consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq’– for artillery rockets.”  – Michael Isikoff and David Corn, […]

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1/27/2003

“On January 27 [2003], [CIA Director George] Tenet was at a National Security Council meeting and the White House handed him a copy of a near-final version of the [upcoming State of the Union] speech, which was now loaded with references to assorted intelligence material and which included one sentence on the uranium-shopping-in-Africa claim. He […]

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1/27/2003

“On January 27 [2003], the [CIA’s] Berlin station replied that German intelligence ‘has not been able to verify [Iraqi defector] [Curveball’s] reporting. …The source himself is problematical. …[T]o use information from another liaison service’s source whose information cannot be verified on such an important, key topic should take the most serious consideration.’ ”  – Michael […]

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1/27/2003

On January 27, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans “Blix reported ‘no convincing evidence’ that Iraq’s stocks of deadly anthrax were ever destroyed, while there was ‘strong evidence’ that Iraq produced more anthrax than it had admitted ‘and that at least some of this was retained.’ Blix also said that Iraq possessed 659 kilograms of […]

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1/27/2003

On January 27, 2003, “Mohammed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), publicly declared that the IAEA inspectors who had been on the ground in Iraq during the months before the invasion had ‘found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program since the elimination of the program in the […]

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1/27/2003

“At a NSC [National Security Council] meeting on January 27, 2003, [CIA Director] George Tenet was given a hard-copy draft of the State of the Union address [President] Bush was to deliver the next day. That day, Tenet returned to CIA headquarters and, without even reading the speech, gave a copy to an assistant who […]

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1/27/2003

“The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had just issued a report taking issue with [Bush] Administration claims that Iraq had an active nuclear program. ‘We have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapon program since the elimination of the program in the 1990’s,’ Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the agency, […]

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1/27/2003

“Hans Blix, the chief U.N. weapons inspector … told the [U.N.] Security Council [on January 27, 2003] that ‘Iraq has decided in principle’ to cooperate on process when it came to granting access to sites and providing support services for U.N. inspectors. ‘Information provided by member states tells us about the movement and concealment of missiles […]

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1/27/2003

“On at least fourteen different occasions prior to the [January 28] 2003 State of the Union, analysts at the CIA, the State Department, and other government agencies who had examined the Niger documents [claiming Saddam sought to purchase yellowcake uranium from them] or reports about them raised serious doubts about their legitimacy. Yet somehow a […]

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1/27/2003

Commander of Coalition Forces General Tommy Franks met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on January 27, 2003. Regarding the potential invasion of Iraq, Mubarak warned: ” ‘You must be very, very careful. We have spoken with Saddam Hussein. He is a madman. He has WMD–biologicals, actually–and he will use them on your troops.’ ”  – […]

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