1/27/2003

Commander of Coalition Forces General Tommy Franks met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on January 27, 2003. Regarding the potential invasion of Iraq, Mubarak warned: ” ‘You must be very, very careful. We have spoken with Saddam Hussein. He is a madman. He has WMD–biologicals, actually–and he will use them on your troops.’ ”  – […]

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1/27/2003

Regarding Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, the Blix Report, issued on January 27, 2003, by chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, read: ” ‘Iraq has declared that it only produced VX [nerve gas] on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said […]

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1/27/2003

The Blix Report, issued on January 27, 2003, by chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, mentioned the ‘Air Force document,’ which “was originally found by an UNSCOM [UN Special Commission on Iraq] inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of […]

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1/27/2003

“On the afternoon of January 27, 2003, Associated Press issued a short news report about [Philip] Zelikow’s appointment as executive director of the 9/11 commission. ‘The fix is in,’ said [counterterrorism czar Richard] Clarke. He knew and disliked Zelikow. Clarke understood that with Zelikow–Zelikow, of all people!–in charge, there was no hope that the commission […]

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1/27/2003

Regarding Iraq’s use of biological weapons, the Blix Report, issued on January 27, 2003, by chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, read: ” ‘Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of this biological warfare agent [anthrax], which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for […]

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1/27/2003

“The [9/11] commission’s first formal meeting was held the next morning–Monday, January 27, 2003–behind closed doors at the Wilson Center [Washington, D.C.].”  – Philip Shenon, The Commission, Page 70 […]

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1/27/2003

“On January 27 [2003], [chief UN weapons inspector] Hans Blix gave a formal report to the United Nations. His inspections team had discovered warheads that Saddam had failed to declare or destroy, indications of the highly toxic VX nerve agent, and precursor chemicals for mustard gas. In addition, the Iraqi government was defying the inspections […]

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1/27/2003

Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans “Blix warned that the deficiencies [in Iraq’s compliance with U.N. weapons inspections] were so grave as to suggest that Saddam did not grasp the gravity of the situation. Iraq, Blix told the Security Council on January 27 [2003], did not seem to have accepted ‘the disarmament which was demanded of […]

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1/27/2003

President “Bush decided to make one more effort to convince the world of Iraq’s perfidy, and on January 27 [2003] he asked [Secretary of State Colin] Powell to present evidence to the United Nations. …’We’ve really got to make the case and I want you to make it,’ Bush said. ‘You have the credibility to […]

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1/27/2003

” ‘Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance–not even today–of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace,’ the UNMOVIC [United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission] director [Hans Blix] told the [UN] Security […]

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