1/27/2003

Regarding Iraq’s use of biological weapons, the Blix Report, issued on January 27, 2003, by chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, read: ” ‘Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of this biological warfare agent [anthrax], which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for […]

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1/27/2003

“The [9/11] commission’s first formal meeting was held the next morning–Monday, January 27, 2003–behind closed doors at the Wilson Center [Washington, D.C.].”  – Philip Shenon, The Commission, Page 70 […]

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1/27/2003

“On January 27 [2003], [chief UN weapons inspector] Hans Blix gave a formal report to the United Nations. His inspections team had discovered warheads that Saddam had failed to declare or destroy, indications of the highly toxic VX nerve agent, and precursor chemicals for mustard gas. In addition, the Iraqi government was defying the inspections […]

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1/27/2003

Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans “Blix warned that the deficiencies [in Iraq’s compliance with U.N. weapons inspections] were so grave as to suggest that Saddam did not grasp the gravity of the situation. Iraq, Blix told the Security Council on January 27 [2003], did not seem to have accepted ‘the disarmament which was demanded of […]

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1/27/2003

President “Bush decided to make one more effort to convince the world of Iraq’s perfidy, and on January 27 [2003] he asked [Secretary of State Colin] Powell to present evidence to the United Nations. …’We’ve really got to make the case and I want you to make it,’ Bush said. ‘You have the credibility to […]

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1/27/2003

” ‘Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance–not even today–of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace,’ the UNMOVIC [United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission] director [Hans Blix] told the [UN] Security […]

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1/27/2003

In The Iraq War Reader Editors’ Postscript for a chapter by Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein: “On January 27, 2003, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, reported on the progress of the new round of inspections begun in late 2002 in Iraq. He told the United Nations Security Council, […]

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1/27/2003

“…on January 27 [2003], the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] reported to the UN Security Council that it had found no evidence of an active nuclear weapons program in Iraq. The aluminum tubes, the agency reported, appeared to be ‘consistent with the purpose stated by Iraq’– for artillery rockets.”  – Michael Isikoff and David Corn, […]

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1/27/2003

“On January 27 [2003], [CIA Director George] Tenet was at a National Security Council meeting and the White House handed him a copy of a near-final version of the [upcoming State of the Union] speech, which was now loaded with references to assorted intelligence material and which included one sentence on the uranium-shopping-in-Africa claim. He […]

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1/27/2003

“On January 27 [2003], the [CIA’s] Berlin station replied that German intelligence ‘has not been able to verify [Iraqi defector] [Curveball’s] reporting. …The source himself is problematical. …[T]o use information from another liaison service’s source whose information cannot be verified on such an important, key topic should take the most serious consideration.’ ”  – Michael […]

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