1/28/2003

“President Bush devoted the last third of his State of the Union address [on January 28, 2003] to a broadside against Saddam…Bush then spoke 16 words that would become notorious: ‘The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.’ …But less than four months earlier, [CIA Director George] […]

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1/28/2003

“On January 28, 2003, [President] Bush delivered his State of the Union address and included the following words, built on [Iraqi defector] Curveball’s claim he had been involved in creating a mobile biological weapons capability: ‘From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are […]

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1/27/2003

“On at least fourteen different occasions prior to the [January 28] 2003 State of the Union, analysts at the CIA, the State Department, and other government agencies who had examined the Niger documents [claiming Saddam sought to purchase yellowcake uranium from them] or reports about them raised serious doubts about their legitimacy. Yet somehow a […]

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1/27/2003

Commander of Coalition Forces General Tommy Franks met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on January 27, 2003. Regarding the potential invasion of Iraq, Mubarak warned: ” ‘You must be very, very careful. We have spoken with Saddam Hussein. He is a madman. He has WMD–biologicals, actually–and he will use them on your troops.’ ”  – […]

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1/27/2003

Regarding Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, the Blix Report, issued on January 27, 2003, by chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, read: ” ‘Iraq has declared that it only produced VX [nerve gas] on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said […]

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1/27/2003

The Blix Report, issued on January 27, 2003, by chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, mentioned the ‘Air Force document,’ which “was originally found by an UNSCOM [UN Special Commission on Iraq] inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of […]

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1/27/2003

“On the afternoon of January 27, 2003, Associated Press issued a short news report about [Philip] Zelikow’s appointment as executive director of the 9/11 commission. ‘The fix is in,’ said [counterterrorism czar Richard] Clarke. He knew and disliked Zelikow. Clarke understood that with Zelikow–Zelikow, of all people!–in charge, there was no hope that the commission […]

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1/27/2003

Regarding Iraq’s use of biological weapons, the Blix Report, issued on January 27, 2003, by chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, read: ” ‘Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of this biological warfare agent [anthrax], which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for […]

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1/27/2003

“The [9/11] commission’s first formal meeting was held the next morning–Monday, January 27, 2003–behind closed doors at the Wilson Center [Washington, D.C.].”  – Philip Shenon, The Commission, Page 70 […]

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1/27/2003

“On January 27 [2003], [chief UN weapons inspector] Hans Blix gave a formal report to the United Nations. His inspections team had discovered warheads that Saddam had failed to declare or destroy, indications of the highly toxic VX nerve agent, and precursor chemicals for mustard gas. In addition, the Iraqi government was defying the inspections […]

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