2/26/2003

On February 26, 2003, President Bush “promised an audience at AEI [American Enterprise Institute], the neo-conservative stronghold, that ‘we will lead in carrying out the urgent and dangerous work of destroying chemical and biological weapons [in Iraq].’ ”  – Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone, Page 209 […]

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2/25/2003

In a speech to Parliament on February 25, 2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said: ” ‘We knew he [Saddam Hussein] had used these weapons [of mass destruction] against his own people, and against a foreign country, Iran, but we had not known that in addition to chemical weapons, he had biological weapons which he […]

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2/25/2003

“On February 25, [2003, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric] Shinseki and his fellow chiefs went before the Senate Armed Services Committee, which was probing the preparations for the all but certain [Iraq] war. During the proceedings, Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat, asked Shinseki how many troops would be needed to control Iraq after […]

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2/25/2003

“U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 25, 2003, that several hundred thousand troops would be needed to sustain security in Iraq in the period after the war. Shinseki echoed the views of other defense analysts developed some eighteen months earlier. But [Secretary of Defense Donald] […]

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2/25/2003

On February 25, 2003, “Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki had told a Senate hearing that a U.S. force ‘on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers’ would be required to occupy Iraq after the initial combat victory. ‘We’re talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that’s fairly significant, with the kinds […]

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2/25/2003

“On February 25, 2003, GEN Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, was testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee when Senator Carl Levin [D-MI] candidly asked him what kind of manpower would be necessary to keep the peace in a postwar Iraq. ‘Something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers would be […]

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2/25/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “172. On 25 February, Mr Blair told the House of Commons that the intelligence was ‘clear’ that Saddam Hussein continued ‘to believe that his weapons of mass destruction programme is essential both for internal repression and for external aggression’. It was also ‘essential to […]

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2/24/2003

On February 24, 2003, “The United States, supported by Britain and Spain, introduces a second resolution to the UN Security Council, authorizing the use of force against Iraq.”  – Todd S. Purdum and The New York Times Staff, A Time of Our Choosing, Page 295 […]

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2/24/2003

On February 23-24, 2003, the UNMOVIC’s (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission’s) College of Commissioners convened to prepare a report for the UN Security Council. “We concluded: ‘It is only by the middle of January [2003] and thereafter that Iraq has taken a number of steps which have the potential of resulting either in the […]

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2/24/2003

“On February 24 [2003], the UK, U.S. and Spain circulated a draft resolution [to the UN Security Council] ‘in blue,’ which is a proposal that is not given a document number and on which no action or voting is yet asked. It asserted that Iraq had failed to comply with November’s Resolution 1441 in that […]

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