2/26/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “175. In a speech on 26 February, President Bush stated that the safety of the American people depended on ending the direct and growing threat from Iraq.”  – Commissioned by the Prime Minister The Right Honourable Gordon Brown MP, “The Report of the Iraq […]

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2/25/2003

On February 25, 2003, “Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki had told a Senate hearing that a U.S. force ‘on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers’ would be required to occupy Iraq after the initial combat victory. ‘We’re talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that’s fairly significant, with the kinds […]

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2/25/2003

“On February 25, 2003, GEN Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, was testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee when Senator Carl Levin [D-MI] candidly asked him what kind of manpower would be necessary to keep the peace in a postwar Iraq. ‘Something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers would be […]

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2/25/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “172. On 25 February, Mr Blair told the House of Commons that the intelligence was ‘clear’ that Saddam Hussein continued ‘to believe that his weapons of mass destruction programme is essential both for internal repression and for external aggression’. It was also ‘essential to […]

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2/25/2003

In a speech to Parliament on February 25, 2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said: ” ‘We knew he [Saddam Hussein] had used these weapons [of mass destruction] against his own people, and against a foreign country, Iran, but we had not known that in addition to chemical weapons, he had biological weapons which he […]

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2/25/2003

“On February 25, [2003, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric] Shinseki and his fellow chiefs went before the Senate Armed Services Committee, which was probing the preparations for the all but certain [Iraq] war. During the proceedings, Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat, asked Shinseki how many troops would be needed to control Iraq after […]

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2/25/2003

“U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 25, 2003, that several hundred thousand troops would be needed to sustain security in Iraq in the period after the war. Shinseki echoed the views of other defense analysts developed some eighteen months earlier. But [Secretary of Defense Donald] […]

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2/24/2003

“The morning of Monday, February 24 [2003], the president [Bush] attended a secret NSC [National Security Council] briefing called ‘Planning for the Iraqi Petroleum Infrastructure: Issues for Decision.’ The president and the others had high hopes that the Iraqi oil industry, if freed from UN sanctions, could be the fast track for a new regime […]

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2/24/2003

Following the National Security Council’s February 24, 2003, briefing on what would happen to the Iraqi oil industry in the event of war: “The president [Bush] affirmed the need to enlist Iraqis and Americans knowledgeable about the oil business to help run the sector. ‘We want to put an Iraqi face on the temporary oil […]

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2/24/2003

In the February 24, 2003, edition of The Scotsman, Tim Cornwell wrote: ” ‘The highest ranking defector ever to turn informant on Saddam Hussein’s government told United Nations weapons inspectors in 1995 that Iraq had destroyed all its chemical and biological weapons stocks after the Gulf War. But UN inspectors hushed up that part of […]

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