3/4/2003

On March 4, 2003, Undersecretary for Policy “Doug Feith gave a secret briefing to the president and the NSC [National Security Council]…on ‘U.S. and Coalition Objectives’ for an Iraq war. It was rosy, pie-in-the-sky political science–everything from visibly improving quality of life for Iraqis to moving toward democracy and obtaining ‘international participation in the reconstruction.’ […]

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3/4/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “194. Mr Blair was informed on the evening of 4 March that US military planners were looking at 12 March as the possible start date for the military campaign; and that Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defense Secretary, was concerned about the apparent disconnect with […]

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3/3/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “188. [On March 3, 2003] Mr Straw told [US] Secretary Powell that the level of support in the UK for military action without a second resolution was palpably ‘very low’. In that circumstance, even if a majority in the Security Council had voted for the […]

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3/2/2003

“The New York Times reported [on March 2, 2003] ‘a senior [Bush] administration official’ as saying that ‘the [Iraq weapons] inspections have turned out to be a trap…We’re not counting on [chief UN weapons inspector Hans] Blix to do much of anything for us.’ ”  – Clare Short, An Honourable Deception?, Page 252 […]

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3/2/2003

“On March 2 [2003], the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) reported that documents it had been given by the U.S. government purporting to show a uranium deal between Iraq and Niger were forgeries.”  – Stephen F. Hayes, Cheney, Page 390 […]

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3/2/2003

From information in a New York Times article on March 2, 2003: “Whereas right after 9/11 a mere 6 percent believed that bin Laden had collaborated with Saddam Hussein, by the eve of [the Iraq] war that figure had risen to 66 percent. A majority now even believed that Iraqis had been among the hijackers.” […]

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3/2/2003

On March 2, 2003, “the Observer newspaper in Britain published a secret directive from the National Security Agency ordering increased eavesdropping on U.N. diplomats.”  – Dafna Linzer, “IAEA Leader’s Phone Tapped,” The Washington Post, Dec. 12, 2004 […]

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3/1/2003

“…U.S. authorities paid a $25 million reward to a Pakistani informant for information that led to [9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh] Mohammed’s capture [on March 1, 2003].”  – Jane Mayer, The Dark Side, Page 269 […]

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3/1/2003

“On March 1 [2003], the Turkish Parliament rejected the US request to move troops through the country [in order to have a northern front in the event of a war with Iraq].”  – Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, Page 325 […]

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3/1/2003

9/11 mastermind “Khaled Sheikh Mohammed’s luck finally ran out on March 1, 2003. American and Pakistani agents tracked him down in a section of the old Raj cantonment city of Rawalpindi, favored by serving and retired Pakistani generals. He was captured in a private house without a fight, sleepy and disheveled in a white T-shirt.” […]

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