3/4/2003

On March 4, 2003, Undersecretary for Policy “Doug Feith gave a secret briefing to the president and the NSC [National Security Council]…on ‘U.S. and Coalition Objectives’ for an Iraq war. It was rosy, pie-in-the-sky political science–everything from visibly improving quality of life for Iraqis to moving toward democracy and obtaining ‘international participation in the reconstruction.’ […]

Read More… from 3/4/2003

3/4/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “194. Mr Blair was informed on the evening of 4 March that US military planners were looking at 12 March as the possible start date for the military campaign; and that Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defense Secretary, was concerned about the apparent disconnect with […]

Read More… from 3/4/2003

3/3/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “188. [On March 3, 2003] Mr Straw told [US] Secretary Powell that the level of support in the UK for military action without a second resolution was palpably ‘very low’. In that circumstance, even if a majority in the Security Council had voted for the […]

Read More… from 3/3/2003

3/2/2003

“The New York Times reported [on March 2, 2003] ‘a senior [Bush] administration official’ as saying that ‘the [Iraq weapons] inspections have turned out to be a trap…We’re not counting on [chief UN weapons inspector Hans] Blix to do much of anything for us.’ ”  – Clare Short, An Honourable Deception?, Page 252 […]

Read More… from 3/2/2003

3/2/2003

“On March 2 [2003], the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) reported that documents it had been given by the U.S. government purporting to show a uranium deal between Iraq and Niger were forgeries.”  – Stephen F. Hayes, Cheney, Page 390 […]

Read More… from 3/2/2003

3/2/2003

From information in a New York Times article on March 2, 2003: “Whereas right after 9/11 a mere 6 percent believed that bin Laden had collaborated with Saddam Hussein, by the eve of [the Iraq] war that figure had risen to 66 percent. A majority now even believed that Iraqis had been among the hijackers.” […]

Read More… from 3/2/2003

3/2/2003

On March 2, 2003, “the Observer newspaper in Britain published a secret directive from the National Security Agency ordering increased eavesdropping on U.N. diplomats.”  – Dafna Linzer, “IAEA Leader’s Phone Tapped,” The Washington Post, Dec. 12, 2004 […]

Read More… from 3/2/2003

3/1/2003

“By the beginning of March 2003, 98 percent of all army reserves and 45 percent of all National Guard intelligence units were on active duty either in the United States or in the Persian Gulf.” [The 1st of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – Matthew M. Aid, The Secret Sentry, Page 247 […]

Read More… from 3/1/2003

3/1/2003

“On March 1 [2003], in a stunning blow, the Turkish parliament rejected the proposal to allow American troops to operate from Turkish bases. The vote was 264 in favor to 251 against, with 19 abstentions… In Washington, Secretary [of State Colin] Powell said that the American military would be ‘flexible enough’ to proceed without Turkish […]

Read More… from 3/1/2003

3/1/2003

Former President George W. Bush recalled, after the capture of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed on March 1, 2003, CIA Director “George Tenet asked if he had permission to use enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. I thought about my meeting with [slain journalist] Danny Pearl’s widow, who was pregnant with his […]

Read More… from 3/1/2003