3/7/2003

“On Friday 7 March [2003] at the [UN] Security Council, [chief UN weapons inspector] Dr [Hans] Blix reported some considerable progress in Iraqi co-operation including the destruction of the ballistic missiles.”  – Clare Short, An Honourable Deception?, Page 251 […]

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3/7/2003

On March 7, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix said: ” ‘unlike the US/UK, the inspectors did not believe they had conclusive evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. This strengthened the widely held view that at any rate Iraq did not constitute a threat that had to be dealt with immediately by […]

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3/7/2003

“On 7 March 2003 the [U.K.] Attorney-General [Peter Goldsmith]…makes clear that he has ‘had the opportunity to hear the views of the US administration from their perspective as co-sponsors of the [UN] resolution.’ He tells us that he was impressed by the strength and sincerity of the views of the US administration that Resolution 1441 […]

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3/7/2003

“President Bush…asked the country to imagine how horrible it would be if one of the bombs [Saddam] made from this [alleged] yellowcake [uranium purchase] exploded in a mushroom cloud and destroyed an American city. But two weeks later [March 7, 2003], the head of the United Nations agency monitoring nuclear weapons proliferation, Nobel Peace Prize […]

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3/7/2003

On March 7, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans “Blix informed the [UN] Security Council that Baghdad had tried to persuade the UN team that Al Samoud II missiles, which it had already declared, fell ‘within the permissible range’ set by the council. However, a panel of international experts had reached the opposite conclusion. Blix […]

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3/7/2003

“[I]n his report to the UN on 7 March [2003], here is what [chief UN weapons inspector] Hans Blix said about Iraq’s cooperation. Having stated that it was increasing, which, as he put it in somewhat of an understatement, ‘may well be due to outside pressure,’ he then addressed the matter of interviews and documents: […]

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3/7/2003

On March 7, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans “Blix asked for more time to finish his job [in Iraq], estimating that the remaining inspections ‘will not take years, nor weeks, but months.’ ”  – Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold, Page 70 […]

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3/7/2003

In a report to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix said: ” ‘…after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January. This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly […]

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3/7/2003

In a report to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei said: “the IAEA had found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq. He presented two stark pieces of information on matters that had recently emerged: […]

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3/7/2003

From Craig Unger’s July 1, 2006, Vanity Fair article: “On March 7 [2003], the I.A.E.A. publicly exposed the Niger documents as forgeries. Not long afterward, Cheney was asked about it on Meet the Press. He said that the I.A.E.A. was wrong, that it had “consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing.” He […]

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