3/7/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “805. … -Dr Blix reported to the [UK] Security Council on 7 March that there had been an acceleration of initiatives from Iraq and, while they did not constitute immediate co-operation, they were welcome. UNMOVIC [United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission] would be […]

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3/7/2003

In a memo written on March 7, 2003, Defense Department official Joseph Collings said Central Command’s Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General John Abidzaid, “appeared to be more concerned than Washington about how the U.S.-led effort [in Iraq] would unfold. ‘We are an antibody in their society,’ Abizaid said in the closed-door meeting [of a U.S. postwar […]

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3/7/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “207. Dr ElBaradei reported that there were no indications that Iraq had resumed nuclear activities since the inspectors left in December 1998 and the recently increased level of Iraqi co-operation should allow the IAEA to provide Security Council with an assessment of Iraq’s nuclear […]

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3/7/2003

In a presentation to the United Nations Security Council on March 7, 2003, former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said: “we all know, in 1991 the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] was just days away from determining that Iraq did not have a nuclear program. We soon found out otherwise… The point is that […]

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3/7/2003

As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “810. … -Lord Goldsmith’s formal advice of 7 March set out alternative interpretations of the legal effect of resolution 1441. While Lord Goldsmith remained “of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure a second resolution”, he concluded (paragraph 28) that […]

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3/7/2003

“On 7 March [2003], [chief UN weapons inspector] Dr [Hans] Blix reported to the [UN] Security Council ‘a substantial measure of disarmament by Iraq with the destruction of large numbers of al-Samoud ballistic missiles.’ It was of this that Dr Blix said to the Security Council: ‘We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal […]

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3/7/2003

“On Friday 7 March [2003] at the [UN] Security Council, [chief UN weapons inspector] Dr [Hans] Blix reported some considerable progress in Iraqi co-operation including the destruction of the ballistic missiles.”  – Clare Short, An Honourable Deception?, Page 251 […]

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3/7/2003

On March 7, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix said: ” ‘unlike the US/UK, the inspectors did not believe they had conclusive evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. This strengthened the widely held view that at any rate Iraq did not constitute a threat that had to be dealt with immediately by […]

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3/7/2003

“On 7 March 2003 the [U.K.] Attorney-General [Peter Goldsmith]…makes clear that he has ‘had the opportunity to hear the views of the US administration from their perspective as co-sponsors of the [UN] resolution.’ He tells us that he was impressed by the strength and sincerity of the views of the US administration that Resolution 1441 […]

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3/7/2003

“President Bush…asked the country to imagine how horrible it would be if one of the bombs [Saddam] made from this [alleged] yellowcake [uranium purchase] exploded in a mushroom cloud and destroyed an American city. But two weeks later [March 7, 2003], the head of the United Nations agency monitoring nuclear weapons proliferation, Nobel Peace Prize […]

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