As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “216. In the last attempt to move opinion and secure the support of nine members of the Security Council, Mr Blair decided on 8 March to propose a short extension of the timetable beyond 17 March and to revive the idea of producing a […]
Category: quotes
3/7/2003
In a report to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix said: ” ‘…after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January. This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly […]
3/7/2003
In a report to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei said: “the IAEA had found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq. He presented two stark pieces of information on matters that had recently emerged: […]
3/7/2003
From Craig Unger’s July 1, 2006, Vanity Fair article: “On March 7 [2003], the I.A.E.A. publicly exposed the Niger documents as forgeries. Not long afterward, Cheney was asked about it on Meet the Press. He said that the I.A.E.A. was wrong, that it had “consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing.” He […]
3/7/2003
In The Iraq War Reader Editors’ Postscript for a chapter by Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein: “On March 7 [2003], [Dr. Mohamed] ElBaradei went further, stating that although his investigations were continuing, his nuclear experts had found ‘no indication’ that Iraq had tried to import hish-strength aluminum tubes or specialized ring magnets for enrichment of […]
3/7/2003
In the July 1, 2006, Vanity Fair article, Craig Unger states: “On March 14, Senator Jay Rockefeller IV, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, wrote a letter to F.B.I. chief Robert Mueller asking for an investigation because “the fabrication of these [Yellowcake] documents may be part of a larger deception campaign aimed at manipulating […]
3/7/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “805. … -By the time the [UK] Security Council met on 7 March 2003 there were deep divisions within it on the way ahead on Iraq.” – Commissioned by the Prime Minister The Right Honourable Gordon Brown MP, “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: […]
3/7/2003
“On the 7th of March 2003 the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, delivered a speech to the United Nations Security Council. He explained that: ‘Based on through analysis, the IAEA has concluded with the concurrence of outside experts that these documents which formed the basis for the report of […]
3/7/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “805. … -On 7 March, Dr ElBaradei reported that there was no indication that Iraq had resumed nuclear activities and that it should be able to provide the [UN] Security Council with an assessment of Iraq’s activities in the near future.” – Commissioned by […]
3/7/2003
“On March 7, 2003, Mohamed El Baradei, the director general of the UN’s nuclear inspection and verification arm, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), made a startling statement in remarks to the Security Council: the uranium intelligence was not credible and there was ‘no evidence or plausible indication’ that Iraq had revived a nuclear weapons […]