Deputy Chief of the Office of Legal Counsel John Yoo’s “March 14, 2003 memorandum essentially states that the President [Bush] is free to override any international treaty in order to conduct his war on terror. It also goes to great lengths to argue that any U.S. law forbidding harsh or torturous techniques would not apply […]
Category: quotes
3/14/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “810. … -Mr Brummell wrote to Mr Rycroft on 14 March: ‘It is an essential part of the legal basis for military action without a further resolution of the Security Council that there is strong evidence that Iraq has failed to comply with and […]
3/14/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “President Chirac told Mr Blair on 14 March that France was ‘content to proceed *in the logic of UNSCR 1441*: but it could not accept an ultimatum or any *automaticity’ of recourse to force’. He proposed looking at a new resolution in line with […]
3/14/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “472. Mr David Brummell (Legal Secretary to the Law Officers) wrote to MrMatthew Rycroft (Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs) on 14 March: ‘It is an essential part of the legal basis for military action without a further resolution of the Security Council […]
3/13/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “471. Lord Goldsmith concluded on 13 March that, on balance, the ‘better view’ was that the conditions for the operation of the revival argument were met in this case, meaning that there was a lawful basis for the use of force without a further […]
3/13/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “264. Reporting developments in New York on 13 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock warned that the UK tests had attracted no support, and the US might be ready to call a halt to the UN process on 15 March. The main objections had included the […]
3/13/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “262. On 13 March, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed withdrawing the resolution on 17 March followed by a US ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave within 48 hours. There would be no US military action until after the vote in the House of […]
3/12/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “250. In a telephone call with President Bush on 12 March, Mr Blair proposed that the US and UK should continue to seek a compromise in the UN, while confirming that he knew it would not happen. He would say publicly that the French […]
3/12/2003
“The plan to disband the Republican Guard but retain the regular [Iraqi] army was approved by President Bush and his war cabinet on March 12 [2003]… One of the PowerPoint slides shown to Bush, which he endorsed, stipulated ‘maintain current status’ of the army as one component of the postwar plan. The United States ‘cannot […]
3/12/2003
As stated in “The Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary”: “252. When he discussed the options with Mr Straw early on 12 March, Mr Blair decided that the UK would continue to support the US. 253. During Prime Minister’s Questions on 12 March, Mr Blair stated: ‘I hope that even now those countries that […]