5/16/2003

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) leader L. Paul “Bremer’s first act of business in Iraq was to define his powers as administrator of the CPA with the enactment of Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1 on May 16, 2003. …Bremer altered Iraqi law in order to implement an economic model preferred by the Bush administration…to implement […]

Read More… from 5/16/2003

5/16/2003

Director of Reconstruction in Iraq L. Paul Bremer issued Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1 on May 16, 2003. It “provided for the ‘De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society.’ All Ba’ath party members holding any position [of importance]…were removed from their jobs. With this Order, 120,000 of Iraq’s most experienced and highest ranking civil servants…were fired.”  – […]

Read More… from 5/16/2003

5/16/2003

On May 16, 2003, “another series of al Qaeda-linked bombings erupted in Casablanca, Morocco, with a death toll of forty-one.”  – Peter Lance, 1000 Years For Revenge, Page 443 […]

Read More… from 5/16/2003

5/16/2003

On May 16, 2003, “the New York Times reported that…[9/11 mastermind] Khalid Shaikh Mohammed had confessed to interrogators that ‘landmarks in New York and Washington, previously selected by Mr. bin Laden, remain on al Qaeda’s target list.’ Included on that list was the Sears Tower in Chicago…”  – Peter Lance, 1000 Years For Revenge, Page […]

Read More… from 5/16/2003

5/16/2003

“On May 16 [2003], a week after [Coalition Provisional Authority leader L. Paul] Bremer arrived [in Iraq], he signed Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1, which was designed to extinguish the Baath Party and Baathists from Iraqi government and society. …Excising Baathists hollowed out the entire Iraqi civil service and professional control over the ministries. […]

Read More… from 5/16/2003

5/16/2003

Coalition Provisional Authority leader L. Paul Bremer’s disbanding of the Iraqi army on May 16, 2003, “contradicted the recommendations of an interagency planning group chaired by the National Security Council.”  – James Risen, State of War, Page 3 […]

Read More… from 5/16/2003

5/16/2003

“The Bush Administration has paid a double penalty for excluding the UN from any real power in Iraq. The first penalty from freezing out the UN is the loss of expertise. No other body has as much experience as the UN in the management of nations after a conflict. …No UN official would have taken […]

Read More… from 5/16/2003

5/16/2003

“The policies on de-Ba’athification, promulgated in [Director of Reconstruction in Iraq L. Paul] Bremer’s first act as Administrator, his CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] Order 1, issued on 16 May, 2003 and entitled ‘De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,’ angered large numbers of people. The Order called for the implementation of the previous CPA decision to disestablish the […]

Read More… from 5/16/2003

5/16/2003

“In mid-May [16, 2003], the new American administrator in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, announced an indefinite postponement of the earlier plan to form a national assembly and interim government by the end of the month. The United States was supported in this decision by its partners, the British. ‘It’s quite clear that you cannot transfer […]

Read More… from 5/16/2003

5/16/2003

On May 16, 2003, Director of Reconstruction in Iraq Paul “Bremer told Iraqi leaders that an interim government would not be formed by the end of the month [as was originally planned by Jay Garner when he was Director of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance]–and that the idea of an interim government with […]

Read More… from 5/16/2003