“The White House has ordered a major reorganization of American efforts to quell violence in Iraq and Afghanistan and to speed the reconstruction of both countries, according to senior administration officials. The new effort includes the creation of an ‘Iraq Stabilization Group,’ which will be run by the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice. The decision […]
Category: quotes
10/5/2003
In regards to former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger’s theft of classified documents from the National Archives: “The archives felt it had no choice but to notify the White House about what happened. On Sunday [October 5, 2003], the archives called the White House and asked to speak to someone at NSC [National Security Council]. […]
10/4/2003
9/11 Family Steering Committee members Mindy Kleinberg and Lorie van Auken were concerned about 9/11 Commission Staff Director Phillip Zelikow’s close ties to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. ” ‘If he’s looking at the NSC [National Security Council], that means he’s investigating himself,’ said Lorie van Auken at the time [in a United Press International […]
10/4/2003
“As the insurgency [in Iraq] strengthened, he [President Bush] asserted [on October 4, 2003] that by taking on the Iraqi resistance, ‘Americans would not have to confront terrorists in the streets of our own cities.’ ” – Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack, Page 236 […]
10/3/2003
Following CIA chief weapons inspector David Kay’s testimony to Congress regarding weapons of mass destruction on October 2, 2003, President “Bush tried to spin things himself the next day [October 3, 2003], saying that Kay’s report ‘states Saddam Hussein’s regime had a clandestine network of biological laboratories, a live strain of deadly agent botulinum, sophisticated […]
10/3/2003
The Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005, quoted from the Iraq Survey Group’s (ISG) Interim Report, which was released on October 3, 2003. ” ‘The ISG concluded that *Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW [biological] weapons and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent* shortly after […]
10/3/2003
The Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005, quoted from the Iraq Survey Group’s (ISG) Interim Report, which was released on October 3, 2003. ” ‘…the ISG *found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW [biological weapons] program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes.’ […]
10/3/2003
The Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005, quoted from the Iraq Survey Group’s (ISG) Interim Report, which was released on October 3, 2003. ” ‘With respect to mobile BW [biological weapons] production facilities, the *ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed or was developing production systems on road vehicles or railway […]
10/2/2003
“In October [2] 2003, [chief weapons inspector David] Kay’s Iraq Survey Group reported on their preliminary findings. Their report confirmed that Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs ‘spanned more than two decades, involved thousands of people, billions of dollars.’ These programs ‘were elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of Operation […]
10/2/2003
“[T]he head of the Iraq Survey Group, David Kay, claimed in a statement about his interim report of October 2, 2003, that the group had discovered ‘dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq had concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002.’ … Laboratories, chemicals […]