In October 2003, President “Bush agreed to set up a new task force, the Iraq Stabilization Group, which was to coordinate Iraq policy from the White House and be run by [National Security Advisor Condoleezza] Rice. Early in October, she sent a memo describing the new group to [Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld, [Secretary of […]
Category: quotes
10/5/2003
In regards to former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger’s theft of classified documents from the National Archives: “The archives felt it had no choice but to notify the White House about what happened. On Sunday [October 5, 2003], the archives called the White House and asked to speak to someone at NSC [National Security Council]. […]
10/4/2003
9/11 Family Steering Committee members Mindy Kleinberg and Lorie van Auken were concerned about 9/11 Commission Staff Director Phillip Zelikow’s close ties to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. ” ‘If he’s looking at the NSC [National Security Council], that means he’s investigating himself,’ said Lorie van Auken at the time [in a United Press International […]
10/4/2003
“As the insurgency [in Iraq] strengthened, he [President Bush] asserted [on October 4, 2003] that by taking on the Iraqi resistance, ‘Americans would not have to confront terrorists in the streets of our own cities.’ ” – Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack, Page 236 […]
10/3/2003
Following CIA chief weapons inspector David Kay’s testimony to Congress regarding weapons of mass destruction on October 2, 2003, President “Bush tried to spin things himself the next day [October 3, 2003], saying that Kay’s report ‘states Saddam Hussein’s regime had a clandestine network of biological laboratories, a live strain of deadly agent botulinum, sophisticated […]
10/3/2003
The Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005, quoted from the Iraq Survey Group’s (ISG) Interim Report, which was released on October 3, 2003. ” ‘The ISG concluded that *Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW [biological] weapons and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent* shortly after […]
10/3/2003
The Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005, quoted from the Iraq Survey Group’s (ISG) Interim Report, which was released on October 3, 2003. ” ‘…the ISG *found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW [biological weapons] program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes.’ […]
10/3/2003
The Silberman-Robb Commission’s report, which was released on March 31, 2005, quoted from the Iraq Survey Group’s (ISG) Interim Report, which was released on October 3, 2003. ” ‘With respect to mobile BW [biological weapons] production facilities, the *ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed or was developing production systems on road vehicles or railway […]
10/2/2003
According to Iraq Survey Group supervisor David Kay’s preliminary finding, reported to Congress on October 2, 2003: ” ‘We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and […]
10/2/2003
“On October 2 [2003], [Iraq Survey Group leader David] Kay had delivered his initial report to a joint House and Senate committee. His bottom line was clear: at the war’s outbreak, Saddam Hussein had almost certainly not possessed the thousands of tons of poison gas and their delivery warheads, the hundreds of kilos of deadly […]