6/16/2004

On June 16, 2004, the 9/11 Commission reported on the then-current status of al Qaeda: ” ‘…the organization is far more decentralized,’ as its leadership has dispersed from Afghanistan, and individual cells have taken on far more authority. The gravest threat comes from potentially catastrophic attacks: ‘Al Qaeda remains extremely interested in conducting chemical, biological, […]

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6/16/2004

The 9/11 Commission hearing on June 16, 2004 featured testimony from ‘Dr. K,’ a covert CIA operative. He said: ” ‘Even after Bin Ladin and al Qaeda are defeated, the global jihadist movement will continue to exist. That movement may again produce another Bin Ladin or al Qaeda as long as there are individuals who […]

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6/16/2004

John Pistole, the FBI’s Executive Assistant Director for Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism, testified at the June 16, 2004 9/11 Commission hearing. When asked if there were al Qaeda cells within the U.S., he replied: ” ‘Absolutely,’ saying that such cells needed to be understood as a combination of possible operatives and ‘facilitators…fund-raisers, [and] recruiters.’ ”  – […]

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6/16/2004

According to the report from the 9/11 Commission hearing on June 16, 2004, the 9/11 plot by al Qaeda: ” ‘painted a picture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the mastermind and chief operative, and Bin Ladin as providing leadership and institutional support.’ …’Bin Ladin met with [his deputy, Mohammed] Atef to discuss the targets for […]

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6/16/2004

In the 9/11 Commission hearing on June 16, 2004, the motivation of the terrorists was questioned. FBI Supervisory Special Agent James Fitzgerald said: ” ‘I believe they feel a sense of outrage against the United States. They identify with the Palestinian problem, they identify with people who oppose repressive regimes, and I believe they tend […]

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6/16/2004

In a 9/11 Commission hearing on June 16, 2004, former CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence Douglas MacEachin said: ” ‘Whether Bin Laden and his organization had roles in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the thwarted Manila [Philippines] plot to blow up a dozen U.S. commercial aircraft in 1995 remains a matter […]

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6/16/2004

“[T]he 9/11 Commission’s Staff Statement [#16, on June 16, 2004] ends by offering the distinctly unpersuasive assessment that ‘al Qaeda today is more a loose collection of regional networks with a greatly weakened central organization.’ ”  – Peter Lance, Cover Up, Page 212 […]

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6/15/2004

In June 2004, “the U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a report that said the State Department lacked a full operational strategy for Afghanistan or ‘an annual consolidated budget’ that would show all U.S. assistance to the country. ‘Expenditure data was not available and consequently, it is difficult to determine the extent to which U.S. assistance […]

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6/15/2004

“Drone strikes began [in Pakistan] in June 2004, and during the Bush administration (which ended in January 2009), a total of only forty-four were fired.” [The 15th of the month used for date sorting purposes only.]  – Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink, Page 54 […]

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6/15/2004

Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote: “By 2004, IED attacks [in Iraq] had risen to nearly one hundred per week, becoming the most deadly weapon our troops faced. …[Central Command chief] General [John] Abizaid urged that we mount a Manhattan Project-style effort to find a solution to IEDs, and in June 2004 we created the […]

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