6/17/2004

On June 17, 2004, “During a radio discussion about an opinion poll showing that most Iraqis did not see American troops as liberators and wanted them to leave the country, [political commentator Bill] O’Reilly told listeners that he had ‘no respect’ for the Iraqi people; they were a ‘prehistoric group,’ and the lesson from the […]

Read More… from 6/17/2004

6/17/2004

When asked why the administration continued to insist that Saddam Hussien had a relationship with al Qaeda, when the same administration denies any connection between Saddam and 9/11? President Bush answered: “The reason I keep insisting that there was a relationship between Iraq and Saddam and al Qaeda, because there was a relationship between Iraq and […]

Read More… from 6/17/2004

6/17/2004

An editorial in The Opinion Pages of The New York Times on June 17, 2004, titled “The Plain Truth,” read in part: “Nevertheless, the Bush administration convinced a substantial majority of Americans before the war that Saddam Hussein was somehow linked to 9/11. And since the invasion, administration officials, especially Vice President Dick Cheney, have continued […]

Read More… from 6/17/2004

6/17/2004

According to CNN on June 17, 2004, President Bush said: ” ‘The reason I keep insisting that there was a relationship between Iraq and Saddam and al-Qaeda was because there was a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda.’ ”  – Al Gore, The Assault on Reason, Page 109 […]

Read More… from 6/17/2004

6/16/2004

“In June [16] 2004, the bipartisan 9/11 Commission–formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States–released its report, which concluded, unanimously, that while there had been contacts between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, it had seen no evidence of ‘a collaborative operational relationship.’ ”  – Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco, Page […]

Read More… from 6/16/2004

6/16/2004

“U.S. attorney Patrick Fitzgerald, who had negotiated a plea bargain with [al Qaeda double agent Ali] Mohamed, testified at some length about him to the 9/11 Commission [on June 16, 2004]: ‘Ali Mohamed…trained most of al Qaeda’s top leadership–including bin Laden and [al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-] Zawahiri–and most of al Qaeda’s top trainers. Mohamed […]

Read More… from 6/16/2004

6/16/2004

According to The 9/11 Commission’s June 16, 2004, report titled ‘Overview of the Enemy:’ “A senior Iraqi intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting bin Ladin in 1994. Bin Ladin is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded. […]

Read More… from 6/16/2004

6/16/2004

According to the staff statement, ‘Overview of the Enemy,’ delivered to the 9/11 Commission on June 16, 2004: “Bin Ladin was a ‘significant player’ among the Arabs who traveled to Afghanistan to resist Soviet occupation in the 1980s. …’following the defeat of the Soviets in the late 1980s, Bin Ladin formed an organization called *The […]

Read More… from 6/16/2004

6/16/2004

In a report on the history of al Qaeda from June 16, 2004, the 9/11 Commission discussed al Qaeda’s financing: ” ‘there is no convincing evidence that any government financially supported al Qaeda before 9/11.’ However, ‘al Qaeda found fertile fundraising ground in the Kingdom [Saudi Arabia], where extreme religious views are common and charitable […]

Read More… from 6/16/2004

6/16/2004

On June 16, 2004, the 9/11 Commission reported on the then-current status of al Qaeda: ” ‘…the organization is far more decentralized,’ as its leadership has dispersed from Afghanistan, and individual cells have taken on far more authority. The gravest threat comes from potentially catastrophic attacks: ‘Al Qaeda remains extremely interested in conducting chemical, biological, […]

Read More… from 6/16/2004