7/15/2005

In July 2005, the Council on Foreign Relations release a report titled, ‘In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities.’ It read: ” ‘The stark reality is that the United States does not have the right structural capacity to stabilize and rebuild nations. Responsibility is diffuse and authority is uncertain. The proper roles of […]

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7/15/2005

“By this summer [2005], Internet trackers such as the SITE [Search for International Terrorist Entities] Institute have recorded an average of nine online statements from the Iraq branch of al Qaeda every day, 180 statements in the first three weeks of July [2005]. [Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-] Zarqawi has gone ‘from […]

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7/15/2005

“The Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Iraq, 2003-2005, published by Iraq Body Count in July 2005, shows 24,865 civilians killed, with women and children accounting for almost 20 per cent of civilian deaths. Thirty per cent of civilian deaths occurred in the invasion phase; post-invasion, the number of civilians killed was almost twice as high […]

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7/15/2005

“When [Acting Chief of the Office of Legal Counsel Steven] Bradbury finished his opinion [on the legality of interrogation practices] in the late spring of 2005 [which was signed by President Bush in July 2005], it expanded the CIA’s legal latitude so that interrogators could use ten or fifteen different techniques at once, including waterboarding, […]

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7/10/2005

According to information in a July 10, 2005, Sunday Times article: “Iraq was facing a civil war, and the consequences would be dire not just for Iraq but for Europe and America. A longtime ally of Washington, [Iraq’s former interim Prime Minister Ayad] Allawi said, ‘The problem is that the Americans have no vision and […]

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7/9/2005

A letter from al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al Zawahiri to an associate of al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi, dated July 9, 2005, was intercepted by U.S. forces in Iraq. In it, Zawahiri stated: ” ‘Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never […]

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7/9/2005

On July 9, 2005, al Qaeda second-in-command “Ayman al-Zawahiri sent a letter to an associate of [al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-] Zarqawi’s, which was intercepted by U.S. forces in Iraq in July 2005, urging him to exercise more restraint in his campaign against the Shia: ‘Many of your Muslim admirers amongst the […]

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7/9/2005

“AQI [al-Qaeda in Iraq] was well financed, as was demonstrated by a [July 9] 2005 letter from al-Qaeda’s number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in which he requested a $100,000 transfer from al-Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate to al-Qaeda headquarters in the tribal areas of Pakistan.”  – Peter Bergen, The Longest War, Page 169 […]

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7/9/2005

On July 9, 2005, al Qaeda second-in-command “Ayman al-Zawahiri described his concept of a post-9/11 base area in a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the al Qaeda leader in Iraq: ‘Establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate over as much territory as […]

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7/9/2005

“In a [July 9] 2005 letter to al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi, bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al Zawahiri, noted that ‘more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.’ Zawahiri said that when it comes to attaining the caliphate…’the strongest weapon which the mujahedin […]

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