“In September 2001 [Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf dispatched [Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) head] General Mahmud [Ahmad] to Washington to try to soften the [U.S./Pakistani] relationship by convincing his CIA counterparts and the [Bush] administration that the Taliban were misunderstood. They were, he argued, simple Pashtuns and Afghan nationalists who could deliver law and order. Their extreme views on women’s rights and other issues were part of their tribal culture. The United States should stop trying to isolate them and engage with them instead. On September 9 [2001] Mahmud had lunch with the director of the CIA, George Tenet, who later wrote, ‘The guy was immovable when it came to the Taliban and al Qaeda. And bloodless, too.’ …Mahmud, said Tenet, reflected Musharraf’s ‘mistrust and resentment,’ as well as that of the Pakistani army and elite, caused by years of sanctions and betrayals that had bedeviled their country’s relationship with the United States.”
– Bruce Riedel, Deadly Embrace, Page 65