In his paper titled ‘Using Special Forces on ‘Our Side’ of the Line,’ written on September 23, 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul “Wolfowitz’s list of the strategic benefits of his proposal [to ally with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban] concluded:
‘*It would demonstrate to the American people and to the world that we know how to fight smart;
*It allows us to leverage the many elements of opposition to the Arab presence in Afghanistan, to the leadership of Mullah [Muhammad] Omar within Taliban and to the Taliban itself;
*By improving our ability to manage our internal allies, it helps to reduce the chances that we will have a vacuum inside Afghanistan if the key elements of the Taliban are neutralized;
*As it becomes clear that this is part of our strategy, it will help to underscore that we are in for a sustained, but intelligent campaign, countering the impression either that we expect quick results or that we are heading for a long-term occupation of Afghanistan with all of the potentially catastrophic consequences which that entails.’ ”
– Douglas Feith, War and Decision, Page 77