“The Bush administration’s decision to respond militarily to 9/11 and to destroy al-Qaida and its Taliban host was justified and successful. But the decision to stay in Afghanistan and to try to build a functioning local government was America’s first major mistake in formulating its post-9/11 policy. …
The second and greater error was the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. We now know that the claim that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was associated with al-Qaida was unfounded. We also know that he had no stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. The three principal decisionmakers, President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, were motivated in part by the sense that the military operation in Afghanistan was not a sufficient retaliation for the blow inflicted on the U.S. homeland.”
– Itamar Rabinovich, “Reflections on the Long-term Repercussions of September 11 for US Policy in the Middle East,” brookings.edu, Tuesday, September 7, 2021